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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation investigates the inclusion of volatility into the asset allocation decision, first as an 
asset class, and second as a tool for dynamic equity allocation. An examination on whether volatility 
exposure as an asset class has the necessary characteristics to form part of the broader investment 
universe is conducted. This is accomplished by comparing the risk-return characteristics of three 
naked option-selling strategies, a bull put spread strategy and a VIX futures strategy with the S&P 
500 Index. Each volatility strategy is also included as part of a 30/30/40 volatility/equity/bond 
portfolio and compared to a traditional 60/40 equity/bond portfolio. Historically, the results indicate 
that all individual volatility strategies generated superior Sharpe ratios and exhibited less severe 
drawdowns than the S&P 500 Index, particularly during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. 
Additionally, all volatility blended portfolios experienced better tail-risk profiles than the 60/40 
equity/bond portfolio, with the naked option-selling strategies also generating similar returns as the 
60/40 portfolio both over the full sample period as well during the period of recovery following the 
2008 Global Financial Crisis. The results suggest that the returns associated with option-selling 
strategies are consistent, and have resulted in strong long-run risk-adjusted performance, qualifying 
short volatility exposure attained through option-selling strategies as an asset class. It however 
remains unclear whether the VIX futures strategy qualifies as an asset class given that it aims to 
exploit a market anomaly in the form of potentially non-priced volatility clustering in the S&P 500 
Index. While the strategy generated considerable outperformance from 2004 to 2009, it 
underperformed from 2009 to 2016 suggesting that much of the non-priced volatility clustering has 
since been traded away. Drawing on the evidence of volatility clustering in equity markets, a managed 
volatility trading rule that regulates portfolio exposure between cash and equity based on how high 
the prevailing volatility level was relative to historical volatility levels is developed. Although 
transaction costs were not accounted for, the results indicated that the managed volatility trading rule 
has historically generated considerably superior Sharpe ratios than equity in developed and 
developing markets. In conclusion, volatility exposure attained through option-selling strategies has 
proven to be an attractive asset class, and historical evidence suggests that its inclusion into a 
traditional 60/40 equity/bond portfolio is likely to reduce the risk of future risk-adjusted 
underperformance relative to what had been achieved in the past. Additionally, the managed volatility 
trading rule remains an attractive alternative to investors who are precluded from investing in 
volatility as an asset class.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
                      INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
 
The strategic asset allocation decision is arguably the most important consideration faced by investors 
given that it explains around 90% of the variability of portfolio returns over time (Ibbotson & Kaplan, 
2000). The decision of which asset classes to select, and the relative weighting assigned to each is 
thus an area that requires continuous improvement. Before evaluating individual assets according to 
their contribution to the overall portfolio risk and return, investors first need to define the universe of 
asset classes available for selection. Greer (1997) defines three broad categories of asset classes: 
capital assets, consumable/transformable assets, and store of value assets. Capital assets are those that 
offer an ongoing stream of cash flows and include equities, which offer dividends, and bonds, which 
offer interest payments. Consumable/transformable assets are used as part of a production process, 
such as commodities. Store of value assets are those that have a value but cannot be consumed and 
do not earn cash flows, such as currencies.  
 
Once the universe of asset classes has been established, the next part of the strategic asset allocation 
decision is selecting and assigning a weight to assets. Equity and sovereign bonds (bonds) are 
generally accepted to be traditional asset classes, and are usually the principal building blocks of 
portfolios. Asness (1996) demonstrates that equity has historically achieved superior returns when 
compared to other assets classes, and suggests this causes investors to select it as the main return 
engine within portfolios. The author also illustrates that while bonds have experienced lower 
historical returns than equity, their historical standard deviation is considerably lower. As a result, 
Asness (1996) illustrates how superior risk-adjusted returns relative to a 100% equity portfolio could 
be earned with the implementation of a 60/40 equity/bond portfolio due to the diversification benefits 
provided by bonds.  
 
It is well-established that other risky asset classes such real estate, gold and other commodities have 
improved the risk and return profile of the traditional 60/40 equity/bond portfolio. Hoesli, Lekander 
and Witkiewicz (2004) conclude that real estate is an effective diversifier to the traditional mix, and 
advocate for a nontrivial real estate allocation within portfolios. Baur and Lucey (2010) prove that 
gold is a ‘safe-haven’ asset that offers strongest performance when traditional portfolios need it the 
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most: during equity market turmoil. Georgiev (2001) shows that an allocation to a basket of 
commodities has historically increased risk-adjusted returns, and have proven to be an effective hedge 
against inflation. These assets, as well as others, have historically been blended with the traditional 
mix of equity and bonds, and have been shown to offer diversification benefits. 
 
More recently, Grant, Gregory and Lui (2007) present a case for short equity volatility exposure, 
captured systematically through selling options contracts on equity, as an asset class. The main 
finding of the authors’ research is that the systematic sale of equity index volatility through the sale 
of volatility derivatives have offered significantly positive, passively generated returns over time. The 
authors also find that a strategy which involves the sale of equity volatility has historically 
outperformed equity during periods of market turmoil, resulting in superior Sharpe ratios being 
generated by volatility exposure when compared with equity. Further, when volatility exposure was 
added to a 60/40 equity/bond portfolio, the newly-created volatility-blended portfolio generated 
superior risk and return characteristics when compared to the traditional mix. The authors conclude 
that volatility meets their definition of an asset class. According to the definition of an asset class 
established by Greer (1997), volatility exposure attained through the systematic sale of options 
contracts is most likely to be classified as a capital asset. This is because option premiums, which 
qualify as cash flows, are systematically being earned. 
 
The sale of put options is akin to attaining short volatility exposure, thus it follows that the purchase 
of put options is akin to attaining long volatility exposure. Israelov and Nielsen (2015) state that 
buying put option protection is a bet that realized volatility will exceed implied volatility over the 
time-horizon of the option. Implied volatility is the market’s expectation of volatility in the underlying 
instrument over the life of an option and is determined by supply and demand dynamics, whereas 
realized volatility is the ex-post volatility experienced by the underlying instrument over the matching 
time-period. The researchers found that volatility risk premium (implied volatility minus realized 
volatility) was positive 88% of the time from 1990 to 2014, and concluded that market turmoil 
analogues to the October 1987 crash would have to occur at least once every 10-years for a long put 
options strategy on the S&P 500 Index to break even.  
 
The fact the volatility risk premium (VRP) has been persistently positive on average is a clear sign 
that there is excessive demand for protection (resulting in the overpricing of protection), and this 
creates an opportunity for supplying protection in the form of systematically selling put option 
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contracts. While this approach may initially appear to be risky, it has been shown by past research to 
generate steady and consistent returns. Further, it is entirely possible to hold an unleveraged position 
by simply holding a 100% cash collateralized portfolio along with the strategy. For example, if at-
the-money (ATM) options are being sold systematically together with holding a fully-collateralized 
portfolio, the drawdown profile of the short volatility exposure strategy should be identical to that of 
the underlying except for the fact that option premiums are still being earned that offset downside 
losses. 
 
VRP has also been found to be significantly positive by other researchers including Latane and 
Rendleman (1976), Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1996) and Jiang and Tian (2005). Past literature has 
offered explanations behind the tendency for VRP to be consistently positive over time. First, the 
demand for option protection generally exceeds the supply of option protection, particularly after the 
2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Second, given that option-selling is akin to selling insurance, 
investors require a premium that is positive over time and competitive with other assets of similar 
riskiness. Third, many investors are constrained against taking short positions and are thus restricted 
from participating. Consistent with the findings of Grant, Gregory and Lui (2007), Rennison and 
Pedersen (2012) also find that systematically attaining short volatility exposure through the sale of 
options has historically outperformed equity on a risk-adjusted basis. 
 
Attaining short volatility exposure through option-selling strategies is neither the only way to attain 
volatility exposure, nor is the only way to generate returns from volatility exposure over time. The 
CBOE Volatility Index (VIX Index) aggregates 30-day implied volatility levels across varying 
degrees of moneyness into a single implied volatility level to represent the overall market consensus 
of volatility over the next 30 days. VIX Index derivatives such as VIX futures enable investors to 
gain exposure to changes in the VIX. Szado (2009) showed that long VIX futures provided highly 
attractive returns during adverse equity market conditions, offering strong tail-risk protection 
characteristics despite experiencing negative long-run returns. Simon and Campasano (2014) 
developed a VIX futures strategy, which found that taking short positions in VIX futures when the 
VIX futures curve is in contango (VIX spot price < VIX front-month future price), and taking long 
positions in VIX futures when the VIX futures curve is in backwardation (VIX spot price > VIX 
front-month future price) achieved substantial returns from 2006 to 2011.  
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The key difference between the VIX futures strategy and the option-selling strategies previously 
described is that the approach developed by Simon and Campasano (2014) is both long and short 
volatility depending on the shape of the VIX futures curve, whereas option-selling strategies are 
systematically short volatility. While a case can been made for short volatility exposure as an asset 
class, it is less clear whether dynamically switching between long and short volatility exposure can 
be classified as an asset class. While systematically selling options provide a reliable stream of cash 
flows in the form of option premiums, the VIX futures strategy exploits potentially non-priced 
volatility clustering. That is, the VIX futures strategy relies on the assumption that the VIX spot price 
will not change over time to the degree suggested by the VIX futures price, i.e. when the VIX spot 
price is lower (higher) than the VIX futures price, it is likely to remain lower (higher) than the VIX 
futures price all the way up to the expiration date. Thus investors can exploit this by buying (selling) 
the VIX future at a discount (premium) relative to the VIX spot, earning returns as the VIX future 
rolls down (up) the curve all the way up to convergence at the expiration date (Simon & Campasano, 
2014). 
 
Collie, Sylvanus and Thomas (2011) found historical evidence of volatility clustering in the S&P 500 
Index, showing that levels of realized volatility tended to be persistent from period to period. In other 
words, the authors found that periods of high (low) realized volatility tended to be followed by periods 
of high (low) realized volatility. Additionally, Collie, Sylvanus and Thomas (2011) found that equity 
returns preceded by periods of high volatility were not significantly different from equity returns 
preceded by periods of low volatility.  
 
Using these findings, Collie, Sylvanus and Thomas (2011) first defined the prevailing level of 
volatility as recent realized volatility given that realized volatility was found to be so persistent in the 
S&P 500 Index. Next, given that returns were not found to be significantly different depending on 
the volatility environment that preceded them, the authors developed a volatility-responsive trading 
rule that increased (decreased) equity exposure when the prevailing rate of volatility (recent realized 
volatility) was high (low) relative to historical standards. The researchers found that superior risk-
adjusted performance was historically earned relative to the S&P 500 Index using a volatility-
responsive trading rule. Specifically, the volatility-responsive trading rule was found to reduce equity 
drawdown risk considerably, while maintaining competitive absolute return levels relative to the S&P 
500 Index. 
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1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
While traditional portfolios such as 60/40 equity/bond mix have performed well in the past, Summers 
(2016) suggests that it is unlikely that this performance will continue due to structurally weaker levels 
of global economic growth caused by secular stagnation. Summers (2016) identifies the global rise 
in the propensity to save as well as a global decline in the propensity to invest as drivers of secular 
stagnation. Specifically, the author attributes the expected structural decline in the global economy to 
the following: first, the rising levels of inequality has resulted in more wealth concentration among 
high net-worth individuals. Wealth concentration results in a lower spending propensities by the 
general public, which in turn drives higher levels of savings propensity. Second, the evidence suggests 
that there has been a rise in reserve accumulation by developing countries, who largely hold reserves 
in the form of highly liquid instruments such as US Treasury-bonds driving yields downward. Third, 
and perhaps most importantly, demographic issues such as lower birth rates and longer life 
expectancies have reduced the growth rate of the working population, resulting in less spending on 
consumer goods and more retirement saving. Summers (2016) suggests that there is a strong 
expectation that the US labour force will not grow over the next 20 years causing a vacuum in 
industries that service the labour force, such as equipment providers and the housing industry. 
Additionally, improvements in technology may substantially reduce the need for more physical 
investment. 
 
While central banks have historically managed to bring spending forward thereby boosting demand 
and economic growth by reducing interest rates, such conventional expansionary monetary policy 
appears to be reaching its limits. This is especially true in the developed world, which currently has 
interest rates that are exceptionally low by historical standards. Additionally, the normalization of 
interest rates from historically low levels may contribute further to challenging conditions for 
traditional asset classes in the future. 
 
Given that the popularity of the traditional 60/40 portfolio, the risk of underperformance relative to 
the past poses a significant problem for investors. In the 60/40 equity/bond mix, equity is primarily 
held due to its relatively high expected return and bonds serve to mitigate equity risk, particularly 
during adverse market conditions. In a world of lower expected growth levels and limited monetary 
policy amid exceptionally low interest rates by historical standards in the developed world, it is 
reasonable to consider that secular stagnation as proposed by Summers (2013) will lead to lower 
6 
 
expected returns relative to the past. It then follows that the risk of such underperformance relative to 
the past, especially on a risk-adjusted basis, is a natural implication of the world view described by 
Summers (2013) given that that equity, which is the main driver of growth within traditional 
portfolios, is forecasted to underperform relative to historical standards.  
 
Therefore, should investors wish to continue to generate comparative returns as had been achieved in 
the past using the same traditional asset classes, it stands to reason that the only way of doing so is 
by shifting more capital from bonds to equity given the need for higher expected returns. However, 
this approach has the unwanted side-effect of raising equity drawdown risk in the process. In order to 
reduce the probability of underperformance relative to benchmarks in the future, the addition of 
another return engine that can also offer further diversification to the traditional 60/40 equity/bond 
portfolio is needed. 
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
The research question investigated in this dissertation is whether volatility, first, in the form of an 
asset class, and second, in the form of a risk management tool, can reduce the risk that a 60/40 
equity/bond portfolio experiences inferior risk-adjusted performance in the future relative to what it 
had accomplished in the past. Specifically, in response to the problem statement described above, this 
dissertation advocates for the inclusion of volatility exposure into the asset management decision, 
first, as an asset class in the form of volatility exposure, and second, as a risk management tool, in 
the form of realized volatility as a forward signal for dynamic equity allocation.  
 
The first part of this dissertation investigates whether volatility exposure can serve as an additional 
driver of performance within traditional portfolios to reduce the risk of underperformance on a risk-
adjusted basis by complementing the role that equity serves in a 60/40 equity/bond portfolio. Some 
investors may have constraints that preclude them from attaining volatility exposure within their 
portfolios. As previously discussed, in order to reduce the risk of underperformance, these investors 
may have no choice but to shift some capital from bonds to equity, thereby increasing equity 
drawdown risk in the process. Thus, the second part of this dissertation investigates realized volatility 
as a risk management tool to reduce equity drawdown risk by regulating equity exposure, specifically 
for investors who may not be able to invest in volatility exposure as an asset class. 
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Regarding the investigation into volatility exposure as an asset class, this dissertation examines three 
approaches: first, strategies that are short near-the-money S&P 500 Index put options. Second, a bull 
put spread strategy which is simultaneously short at-the-money S&P 500 Index put options and long 
a 10% out-the-money S&P 500 Index put options with the same expiration date. Third, a VIX futures 
trading rule wherein trade direction is determined by whether the VIX futures curve is in contango or 
backwardation. Given the evidence for a considerable asymmetry of returns favouring the sellers of 
protection, this dissertation investigates three option-selling strategies which are each fully-
collateralized with 3-month United States of America Treasury bills (US T-bills). They are: the CBOE 
PutWrite Index which replicates the sale of 30-day at-the-money (ATM) S&P 500 Index put options, 
a short ATM second-month S&P 500 Index put options strategy and a short 5% out-the-money 
(OTM) second-month S&P 500 Index put options strategy. A bull put spread strategy that is 
simultaneously short ATM and long 10% OTM second-month S&P 500 Index put options is also 
investigated. 
 
Given that the S&P 500 Index has experienced strong growth with relatively low levels of volatility 
since the end of the period of investigation chosen by the authors, this dissertation investigates a 
similar rendition of the strategy, fully-collateralized with 3-month US T-bills, over a lengthened 
period from 2004 to 2016. The period from 2009 to 2016 is also isolated in order to determine whether 
the strategy persistently generated remarkably high returns during such a positive period of 
performance by the S&P 500 Index. 
 
This dissertation evaluates the characteristics of each derivative strategy that provides volatility 
exposure according to a risk-return framework to determine whether volatility exposure qualifies as 
an asset. The annualized holding period return (HPR) of each strategy will be compared with that of 
the S&P 500 Index, and the risk of each approach will be proxied by volatility, drawdowns, Value-
at-Risk (VaR), Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) and worst 6-month HPR. Once strategies have 
been individually assessed and contrasted with equity, each will represent volatility in a 30/30/40 
volatility/equity/bond strategy that will be compared with a traditional 60/40 portfolio to determine 
whether the inclusion of volatility into traditional portfolios would have improved risk-adjusted 
returns historically. 
 
Regarding the investigation into realized volatility as a risk management tool, this dissertation 
validates the assumption that equity returns do not differ significantly depending on the volatility 
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environment they were preceded by in developed and developing markets. A managed volatility 
trading rule that uses recent weighted realized volatility as signals to regulate portfolio exposure 
between equity and 3-month US T-bills in developed and developing markets is also investigated. 
The viability of the managed volatility trading rule will be compared with equity in each market based 
on historical annualized holding period return well as risk measures including volatility, drawdowns, 
VaR, CVaR and worst 6-month HPR. 
 
1.4 CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
In a world characterized by lower growth expectations and limited ability for central banks to effect 
expansionary monetary policy, it is prudent for diversification to be a staple for global investors. Past 
research has contributed to this end by investigating different strategies to capture volatility exposure 
as an additional asset class, which has been shown to improve diversification within portfolios. This 
dissertation aims to contribute to literature by comparing and contrasting several volatility exposure 
strategies on a level playing field. That is, this study takes several approaches that capture volatility 
exposure and uses each to replace half of the equity exposure in a traditional 60/40 equity/bond 
portfolio, such that the risk and return characteristics of each approach can be examined in an overall 
portfolio context.  
 
Further, for investors who are precluded from attaining volatility exposure, this dissertation builds on 
past research which has used realized volatility on the S&P 500 Index as a risk management tool to 
successfully reduce S&P 500 Index drawdown risk while maintaining competitive levels of absolute 
return. This study also back tests the managed volatility trading rule on 3 other MSCI indexes in order 
to investigate its performance on global equity markets 
 
1.5 LIMITATIONS 
 
This dissertation limits the evaluation of volatility exposure as an asset class to equity index volatility 
on the S&P 500 Index. This is because the implied volatility data, used to price options, and volatility 
index futures prices that could be sourced, began too recently to justify adequate comparison with the 
US data. However data has been sourced to proxy for both developed and developing market equity, 
upon which the use of realized volatility as a signal to reduce equity drawdown risk can be explored. 
This dissertation ignores all taxation and transaction costs. Additionally, unless otherwise stated, 
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closing prices were used in this study without considering bid-ask spreads. These omissions may have 
a bearing on how each strategy performed theoretically, compared with how they would have 
realistically performed with the inclusion of transaction costs and other leakages.  
 
1.6 CONCLUSION AND STRUCTURE OF DISSERTATION 
 
The addition of a new asset class into the existing universe of asset classes available to investors is 
always welcomed. This is especially the case given the predictions of secular stagnation theory, which 
suggests that future global growth levels ought to be lower than what had been experienced in the 
past. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that the inclusion of an additional return engine into the universe 
of asset classes available to investors would be of great benefit. 
 
Past research has found that volatility as an asset class has historically generated competitive absolute 
annualized HPRs similar to equity, with improved downside characteristics. This dissertation 
examines whether the inclusion of volatility as an asset class has historically improved the risk and 
return characteristics of a traditional 60/40 portfolio, to evaluate whether its inclusion will reduce the 
risk of future underperformance relative to what had been achieved in the past. Some investors may 
have constraints that disallow them from trading derivatives. Thus, this dissertation investigates the 
use of realized volatility as a risk management tool such that equity drawdown risk can be reduced in 
the event of higher equity allocations being necessary to reduce the risk of underperformance in 
absolute terms in future. 
 
The balance of this dissertation is divided up as follows: Chapter 2 provides background information 
on the major topics under investigation. Chapter 3 elaborates on the data sourced for this study as 
well as the methodologies used in developing the various strategies that follow. Chapter 4 focuses on 
discussing the findings of the strategies investigated and compares these discoveries to past literature. 
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation and suggests further areas of investigation. 
 
1.7 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
The list of abbreviations used throughout this dissertation: 
 
Table 1: List of abbreviations 
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Acronym Definition 
ATM At-the-money 
Cap Market capitalization 
CBOE  Chicago Board Options Exchange 
CML Capital Market Line 
EAFE Europe, Australasia and Far East 
EM Emerging Markets 
EMH Efficient Market Hypothesis 
FM Frontier Markets 
FOMC Federal Open Market Committee 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GFC Global Financial Crisis 
HPR Holding Period Return 
ITM In-the-money 
MSCI Morgan Stanley Capital International Europe 
OTM Out-the-money 
QE Quantitative Easing 
R* Natural rate of interest 
S&P  Standard & Poors  
T-Bill Treasury bill 
T-Bond Treasury bond 
US United States of America 
VIX Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index 
VRP Volatility Risk Premium 
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CHAPTER TWO 
                LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 2 is focused on providing a holistic review of past literature relevant to this study. First, 
recent works on secular stagnation that provide the impetus for seeking to both explore other equity-
like return streams as well as new risk management strategies that may implicitly reduce equity 
drawdown risk will be explored. Second, past research that investigated option-selling strategies will 
be investigated together with an alternative strategy to capture returns from volatility products in the 
form of a VIX futures strategy. Finally, past research on the use of volatility as a potential forward 
indicator that regulates equity exposure to reduce equity drawdowns will be examined.  
  
2.2 SECULAR STAGNATION 
 
Hansen (1939) first introduced the theory of secular stagnation which postulated that due to thinning 
investment opportunities as well as other economic issues experienced after the Great Recession, 
savings were expected to begin exceeding investment causing GDP to underperform potential GDP 
structurally. The author’s views did not pan out at the time with the US entering World War II in 
1941, following which significant economic growth was experienced on the back of vast amounts of 
government investment. There has been a resurgence of the theory most notably by Summers (2013) 
and Krugman (2013) that argue that the theory put forth by Hansen (1939) may have been incorrect 
only in timing, and that the issues he raised may likely fit those currently being observed in the world 
economy.  
 
Summers (2013) notes that current interest rates are low by historical standards in most developed 
nations. This observation also holds for expected future real interest rates when considering current 
10-year interest rates and 10-year expected inflation rates in the industrial world as priced in by 
markets. The present expectation for extraordinarily low real interest rates to be far below what has 
been experienced in the past, is not a recent phenomenon. Many researchers including Laubach and 
Williams (2003) as well as Barsky, Justiniano and Melosi (2014) have found that real interest rates 
in the US have been downward sloping for a considerable amount of time. The implication of which 
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is that there must exist a set of factors that are increasing the propensity to save and decreasing the 
propensity to invest, given that the real interest rate is the equilibration between savings and 
investments (Summers, 2016). 
 
Summers (2016) suggests that some causes for the increasing propensity to save are first, rising 
inequality with more wealth concentration in high net-worth individuals resulting in lower spending 
propensities by the general public and a greater degree of savings propensity. Second, rising reserve 
accumulation in developing countries, who largely hold reserves in the form of highly liquid 
instruments such as US Treasury-bonds driving yields downward. Third, demographic issues such as 
longer life expectancies driving the need for increasing savings so as to have enough capital for 
retirement, and decreased spending while in retirement to ensure that savings stretch as far as possible 
combined with household deleveraging.  
 
Regarding the tendency for the decrease in the propensity to invest, the author suggests that some 
drivers may include the expectation that the US labour force will not grow over the next 20 years 
causing a vacuum in industries that service the labour force, such as equipment providers and the 
housing industry. Additionally, improvements in technology may substantially reduce the need for 
more physical investment. 
 
Summers (2016) notes that the less-than-impressive growth from 2003 leading up to the GFC was 
only achieved on the back of a vast erosion of credit standards and what is today considered to be a 
bubble in the housing market. The fact that such a stimulatory environment propelled merely ‘normal’ 
growth rates indicates that without such stimulus, the period may have resulted in sub-standard 
growth leading one to draw parallels to today's expectation of future growth. 
 
Laubach and Williams (2003) define the natural rate of interest, often referred to as R*, as the real 
short-term interest rate that equates output with potential output, where potential output is the 
economy’s long-run growth rate which is consistent with stable inflation. R* is the unobservable 
equilibrating factor between savings and investment and is the real neutral interest rate in that it is 
neither stimulatory nor contractionary.  
 
Stimulative monetary policy in the US has traditionally been achieved through a reduction in the 
federal funds rate. This easing acts to ‘pull-forward’ demand, encouraging consumers to purchase 
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assets such as motor vehicles and property earlier than they otherwise would have given the cheaper 
cost of credit. This brings spending forward and thus acts to kick-start the economy and fills a 
temporary shortfall in demand. It follows then that having a clear understanding of what the prevailing 
R* is of considerable importance for monetary policy, because expansionary policy can only be 
effective if real rates are reduced below R*. Thus implying that if current R* is too low to begin with, 
conventional stimulatory monetary policy has a severely limited impact.  
 
Since 1960, Summers (2016) found that the average amount of monetary easing during recessions 
has been a decrease of 5.1% in real terms per episode. Given how markets are currently pricing their 
expectations of future real interest rates, the author believes that the probability of the US being able 
to stimulate the economy during a recession to the degree that has been done in the past is highly 
unlikely. The author acknowledges that quantitative easing has been used in the past as an 
unconventional monetary policy tool, but while effective during its initial implementation buying into 
substantially illiquid fixed income markets and reducing large credit spreads, its effectiveness is 
largely seen to be diminishing. It therefore follows that the implication of secular stagnation is a 
permanent demand shortfall, where the ‘pulling-forward’ of spending is fast reaching the point of 
severely diminishing returns, resulting in the conclusion that standard monetary policy cannot be 
relied on the next time a recession comes.  
  
What does this all mean for the rest of the world? The phenomenon of low real rates is not unique to 
the US, as Rachel and Smith (2015) find that global real rates have declined 4% from 1980 to 2015, 
and state that there exists no reason for global R* to recover over the next 15 years. If interest rates 
are truly going to be ‘lower for longer’, it follows that bond and equity values which are computed as 
the present value of future cash flows can only go up if either the discount rate decreases or expected 
cash flows increase. While the advent of globalization has had a major contribution to global 
economic growth, with open trade and the improved flow of capital and labour being some of its 
mechanisms, it has also brought with it the risk of rapid, and significant contagion effects. Should the 
‘new normal’ of lower global growth rates manifest, contagion effects may be exacerbated as yield-
seeking investors look to drive substantial amounts of capital to developing economies. While 
increased investment may lead to a beneficial outcome to developing nations in the short-run, should 
another global crisis surface, the ‘flight to quality’ and need for liquidity by the same international 
investors may lead to a simultaneous sell-off in developing markets leading to a convergence in the 
correlations of local asset classes. 
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Another consideration is the fact that the US Federal Reserve increased the federal funds rate by 
0.25% in December 2015 for the first time since 2006 ending a 7-year period during which rates were 
near their lower bound of 0% to support the recovery post the GFC, with further rate hikes expected 
in the near-future (Cox, 2015). In the pursuit of achieving their policy objective of a 2% inflation 
target, the Federal Reserve were clear on the desire of ‘normalizing’ interest rates as long as the 
economy allowed for it. Further, negative interest rates in developed markets such as Germany and 
Switzerland have left the developed world with a relatively limited ability to reduce interest rates. 
Should a global program of ‘normalizing’ interest rates ensue, the rising rates are likely to have a 
negative impact on the returns on traditional asset classes such as equity and bonds. Volatility on the 
other hand is not directly influenced by interest rates, rather, is the result of supply and demand 
dynamics in derivative markets and may thus reduce interest rate sensitivity of portfolios.  
 
Equity drawdowns will be experienced at the same time as drawdowns experienced in equity option-
selling strategies given that such options will only pay out when equity experiences losses. However, 
given that premiums are consistently earned from consistently selling options, drawdowns are less 
severe, and recoveries are more rapid than equity (Rennison & Pederson, 2012). Should the world 
begin exhibiting tendencies that are described by secular stagnation theory, and equity begins 
generating disappointing long-run returns, option-selling strategies are still likely to contribute to 
portfolio growth given consistent premiums being received (Rennison & Pederson, 2012). Should the 
world turn out remarkably different to what is predicted by the theory, the benefits of the introduction 
of volatility as asset class into traditional portfolios should still hold in that it has generated returns 
which have been found to be significantly positive over the long-run, with less severe drawdowns 
than equity. Further, the impact that normalizing interest rates may have on equity prices, combined 
with the limited strength that monetary policy currently has if another large market crisis was to 
manifest puts forth the case for investors to implement robust risk management programs such as 
those presented in this dissertation. 
 
2.3 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF VOLATILITY EXPOSURE AS AN ASSET CLASS 
 
Greer (1997) defines three broad categories of asset classes: capital assets, consumable/transformable 
assets, and store of value assets. Capital assets are those that offer an ongoing stream of cash flows 
and include equity, which offer dividends, and bonds, which offer interest payments. The intrinsic 
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value of a capital asset is normally the present value of its future cash flows, discounted at an 
appropriate discount rate. The price of a capital asset is driven by market supply and demand 
dynamics that guide its price to a level approximately equal to the consensus’ view of its intrinsic 
value. Consumable/transformable such as commodities, and store of value assets such as currencies, 
do not generate cash flow, and thus their price is determined only by supply and demand dynamics. 
 
There has been a definite rise in the popularity of exchange-traded volatility-related since the 
beginning of the 21st century (Whaley, 2013). The most pronounced increase in demand came after 
the 2008 GFC, when long volatility exposure proved to be a very effective counter-balance to the 
sharp fall in equity prices (Alexander, Kapraun & Korovilas, 2015). Lin and Lin (2016) agree with 
the assertion that long volatility exposure provides negative correlation with the underlying equity, 
suggesting that the rise in popularity of volatility-related products is mainly attributable to the value 
of hedging volatility risk by taking long positions in volatility derivatives such as VIX futures.  
 
Grant, Gregory and Lui (2007) contend that volatility qualifies as an asset class that can be added to 
the investment universe available to investors. According to the authors, volatility exposure has 
historically offered significantly positive returns that have been generated without being attributable 
to the skill of the investor, but rather, captured passively using a systematic approach. Further, the 
authors found that even short volatility exposure has the tendency to outperform equity even in market 
crisis’ suggesting that attractive absolute returns and diversification benefits offered by volatility 
exposure justify it meeting the definition of an asset class. Under the framework established by Greer 
(1997), given that option-selling results in cash flows being earned in the form of option premiums, 
short volatility exposure is similar to a capital asset.  
 
Hafner and Wallmeier (2007) also advocate for volatility exposure as an asset class finding that a 
passive strategy involving systematically selling variance swaps has performed resoundingly well 
relative to traditional asset classes historically. Daigler and Rossi (2006) find that when combined 
with equity, long volatility exposure has historically been a highly effective diversifier. Rennison and 
Pederson (2012) strongly support volatility exposure as an asset class finding that the sale of options 
on various underlying instruments has demonstrated highly attractive risk and return characteristics 
over time with imperfectly correlation with traditional asset classes. 
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2.4 VOLATILITY RISK PREMIUM 
 
2.4.1 Characteristics of the volatility risk premium 
 
Christensen and Prabhala (1998) state that the volatility that is implied by an option premium is the 
market’s estimate of the level of volatility over the remaining life of the contract. If one considers all 
variables in the formula used to calculate the price of an option as put by Black and Scholes (1973), 
if the current underlying stock price, strike price, time to expiry, risk-free interest rate and option 
premium is known, then the only unknown variable that is embedded in the calculation is implied 
volatility. Realized volatility is the ex-post calculation of volatility, calculated over the matching 
period using the actual results of the underlying instrument. The tendency for implied volatility to 
exceed realized volatility has long been established by researchers including Latane and Rendleman 
(1976), Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1996) and Jiang and Tian (2005) to name but a few. The positive 
spread between implied and realized volatility is known as the volatility risk premium (Israelov & 
Nielsen, 2015). 
 
More recently, Israelov and Nielsen (2015) compared S&P 500 Index’s 21-business-day annualized 
realized volatility with the VIX Index, which is the S&P 500 Index’s volatility implied by option 
prices calculated using a range of options with varying degrees of moneyness but with a constant 30-
day expiry (analogous to 21-business-days). Consistent with prior research, the authors find that on 
average, over a 24-and-a-half year period measured until mid-2014, a 3.40% volatility risk premium 
(VRP) is observed and that VRP had been positive 88% of the time. The authors also found that 
negative VRP returns came about when implied volatility was less than realized volatility. This 
mainly occurred during market downturns as losses which were not anticipated by options markets 
caused downward momentum in markets which then resulted in spiking volatility levels. The authors 
also noted that VRP had a quicker recovery time from drawdowns than equity as options markets 
were quick to price in higher volatility levels once a market crisis began unfolding requiring higher 
returns for selling options during a crisis. Thus in a relatively short period, implied volatility once 
again exceeded realized volatility and a recovery of VRP ensued.  
 
Rennison and Pedersen (2012) investigated various markets including equity indices, commodity 
futures, currencies and swaptions and aimed to capture VRP in each market from 1994 to 2012. The 
study’s findings serve to illustrate VRP’s characteristics. First, the authors found that on average, 
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each had a positive VRP corresponding to the value of about 10% of the average level of implied 
volatility. What is also interesting to note is that the magnitude of VRP varied across markets with 
commodity futures displaying the highest average implied volatility of 37.40% with a 4.40% VRP 
and currencies displaying the lowest average implied volatility of 10.30% with a 0.90% VRP. Sharpe 
ratios were all positive with the lowest being 0.70 for currencies and highest being 1.20 for 
commodity futures.  
 
As volatility risk premium will be negative if realized volatility exceeds implied volatility, and given 
that negative VRP should occur as a result of a market crash that was not expected by market 
participants, Rennison and Pedersen (2012) found that VRP displays negative skewness over the 
short-run. Specifically, all strategies under investigation experiencing 3 to 4 standard deviation losses 
and 2 to 3 standard deviation gains over 1-month periods. When considering the longer-run, the 
authors found that VRP displays significant positive skew with with all strategies experiencing only 
1 to 2 standard deviation losses but with 2 to 5 standard deviation gains over 12-month periods.  
 
The authors also found that while VRP strategies may experience sudden sharp losses in the short 
run, they tend to recover very quickly consistent with past research. When considering the average 
length of drawdowns, VRP strategies experienced a relatively low 5-month period on average 
compared to over a 1-year period for US large market capitalization (large cap) equity. The reason 
cited by Rennison and Pedersen (2012) for this phenomenon is that implied volatility tends to 
overreact to market crisis’ as the demand for hedging risk spikes and stays elevated for a considerable 
amount of time resulting in a relatively fast recovery for VRP. Should this hypothesis hold, it appears 
that volatility may exhibit a strong mean-reversion tendency. These results are also consistent with 
other empirical evidence that found that VRP experiences consistent small gains with short, large 
losses attributable to events that cause realized volatility to spike above implied volatility.  
 
2.4.2 Explanations for the existence of the volatility risk premium 
 
Researchers have offered explanations for the evidence that there exists a significantly positive 
volatility risk premium over time. The introduction of derivative markets have afforded investors the 
ability to externalize price risk in the short-run in the pursuit of capturing long-run risk premium in 
volatile assets such as equity. The ability to truncate at least some downside by the externalization of 
price risk, while usefulness, is also expensive.  
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Bollen and Whaley (2004) demonstrate that there exists a stark imbalance between supply and 
demand in the options market. The authors find that of all tradeable S&P 500 options in circulation, 
the majority of those actually traded are put options. Specifically, they find that the majority of this 
imbalance is caused by the demand brought about by put option buyers significantly exceeding the 
supply provided by put option writers.  
 
Broker-dealers have been the main suppliers of put options, and Garleanu, Pedersen and Poteshman 
(2009) observed that these market makers, who are the intermediaries taking opposing positions to 
market participants, cannot perfectly hedge away exposures. This combined with the daily cost 
associated with hedging their own exposure mean that market makers, who are understandably risk-
averse, require compensation for the risk of their unhedged inventory together with the cost of their 
hedged inventory which is reflected in option prices.  
 
Given that the majority of demand for put options lie with option buyers, the authors also note that 
market makers will not simply supply an infinite amount of a particular option. Market makers are 
forced to charge higher prices for the same options to compensate them for growing risks and costs 
such as the degree to which imperfect hedges may harm them as well as hedging costs. The above is 
consistent with Black and Scholes (1973) who conceded that option holders would be expected to 
pay premiums higher than those computed by the Black-Scholes Pricing Model given the transaction 
costs associated with such purchases that are effectively borne by option holders. 
 
Israelov and Nielsen (2015) back-tested a protective put strategy that involved being long the S&P 
500 Index together with holding 5% out-the-money put options with monthly expiration dates. The 
researchers found that the strategy produced a lower risk-adjusted return as compared to holding only 
the S&P 500 Index and concluded that the high cost associated with holding put options as a strategy 
results in relative underperformance. 
 
Gromb and Vayanos (2010) suggest that there are costs associated with arbitrage that prevent 
arbitrageurs from exploiting all mispricings including costs of short-selling, fundamental and non-
fundamental risks, leverage and margin constraints, as well as constraints on equity capital. Given 
these limitations faced by professional arbitrageurs, there may exist an opportunity for investors with 
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a long-term investment horizon who can withstand deep losses in the short-run in order capture the 
VRP over the long-run. 
 
2.4.3 Capturing the volatility risk premium  
 
There are a few ways to capture VRP, and while all involve the net sale of implied volatility, each 
may differ in terms of trading costs, risk, difficulty to implement and delta-hedging (which involves 
hedging against moves in the underlying markets such that the position is primarily exposed to 
changes in volatility).  
 
• Options strategies 
 
Option-selling strategies such as the sale of out-the-money put options are the simplest approach to 
capturing VRP. Option writers implicitly bet that the implied volatility used to price the premium 
received will exceed realized volatility and thus the quantity they must pay out on average over the 
long-run (Israelov & Nielsen, 2015). The maximum loss of writing a put option is the entire strike 
price minus the option premium received. Additionally, option-selling strategies are by definition 
correlated with the directional moves in underlying instruments which is the reason that some 
investors choose to delta-hedge. However, perfect delta-hedging can only be achieved temporarily 
given the speed of market movements, therefore even with high-frequency delta-hedging, some 
correlation with the underlying instrument is inevitable (Garleanu, Pedersen & Poteshman, 2009). 
 
Other options strategies include selling straddles which involve selling both a call and a put on an 
underlying instrument with the same strike price and expiration date thereby receiving premiums for 
both (Moschini & Lapan, 1992). The maximum loss on the put will be the strike price minus the 
premium, however the maximum loss on the call is theoretically unlimited which however unlikely, 
is a drawback to this approach. A similar strategy is the short strangle which differs from the short 
straddle only in the put and call options are sold with different strike prices, that is, they are both sold 
slightly out-the-money but on the same underlying instrument and with the same expiration date 
(Schneeweis & Spurgin, 2001). The advantages and disadvantages of this approach are largely similar 
to the straddle. 
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A method investors can use to place an explicit floor on potential losses when realized volatility 
exceeds implied volatility is the bull put spread strategy which involves the simultaneous sale of a 
put option and the purchase of another put option with the same expiration date but lower strike price 
(Chaput & Ederington, 2005). In this approach, the premium received for selling a put option that is 
closer to the money should exceed the premium paid away for buying a put option further from the 
money. This results in the investor being a net seller of protection, but only captures part of the VRP 
as some has been sacrificed to place a limit on the maximum potential loss to the differential between 
the strike prices of the two options. This method of limiting maximum loss by using some premium 
to purchase protection further from the money than where the investor is selling protection can be 
applied to all option strategies that attempt to capture VRP. 
 
• Variance swaps 
 
Selling variance swaps allow investors to take a directional position in the volatility embedded in 
option prices without having to trade options and periodically delta-hedge. The payoff structure is 
directly linked to the spread between implied and realized volatilities, and because it is available on 
over-the-counter (OTC), it is reasonably easy to trade. As the name would suggest, the difference 
between implied and realized variance and not volatility on some underlying instrument will be 
settled at the expiration date. 
 
2.4.4 The inclusion of volatility risk premium in a portfolio 
 
The case built by Summers (2013) that the global economy is facing a long-run reduction in demand 
is a compelling reason for the inclusion of VRP which, in the long-run, should be more shielded from 
such environments given the consistent earning of option premiums. Thus, given that option-selling 
strategies have been found by Rennison and Pedersen (2012) to generate equity-like returns in the 
past, it follows that the replacement of some equity exposure with short volatility exposure would 
reduce the reliance placed on equity as the main driver of portfolio returns with the inclusion of 
another return engine. Equity volatility exposure as an asset class will by definition experience 
drawdowns when equity experiences drawdowns, however, given that premiums are received 
consistently, these portfolios with a combination of equity and volatility will experience drawdowns 
that are less severe and recoveries that are more rapid than portfolios with only equity exposure 
(Rennisson & Pedersen, 2012).  In an attempt to limit the severity of drawdowns further, the 
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feasibility of a bull put spread strategy that pays some premia away in order to limit downside while 
still being exposed to some upside is investigated.  
 
Rennison and Pedersen (2012) evaluate VRP’s portfolio contribution potential, comparing return, 
risk and correlation characteristics with other asset classes during four sub-periods: pre-crisis (1994-
2007), the GFC (2007-2009), recovery (2009-2010) and sovereign crisis (2010-2012). The authors 
find that VRP experienced strong positive returns during the pre-crisis, recovery and sovereign crisis 
periods, and even though it suffered losses during the financial crisis period, it had significantly higher 
Sharpe ratios that were positive on average when compared to US large cap stocks which had a 
negative Sharpe ratio. This is in line with the evidence provided by the authors which showed that 
VRP experienced strong recoveries due to market overreaction which allowed for relatively short 
drawdown episodes. 
 
Regarding correlation, the authors find commodity, currency and interest-rate VRP to have a 
relatively low positive correlation with US large stocks, emerging market equity, emerging market 
bonds, commodities and currency. The highest correlation was between commodity volatility and 
emerging markets at 34%. However, equity VRP had fairly stronger correlations with more traditional 
assets with a 50% correlation with US large cap stock and a 63% correlation with emerging market 
equity. Correlations across assets did increase as one would expect during the financial crisis period 
with correlations between equity VRP and US large stocks being 67% and equity VRP and emerging 
market equity being 71%.  
 
While hedging the drawdown risk of VRP needs to be considered, the reliability of returns evidenced 
by Rennison and Pedersen (2012) perhaps make it like no other asset class. In terms of the 
sustainability of returns, Israelov and Nielsen (2015) investigated the VRP from 1990 to 2014, and 
found that the average positive spread between implied and realized volatility did not appear to have 
shrunk during the period. Even after the authors compared the VRP after bucketing implied 
volatilities as represented by the VIX Index into deciles, the lowest average VRP in decile 1 was 2.5% 
compared to the highest VRP in decile 9 of 4.7%.  
 
2.4.5 VIX futures strategy 
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Capturing the VRP using options is not the only way of deriving a return stream from volatility. 
Simon and Campasano (2014) suggest that the rise in popularity of other volatility products such as 
VIX futures contracts is owed to their consistently negative correlation with equity returns. Szado 
(2009) showed that long VIX futures provided highly attractive returns during adverse equity market 
conditions, offering strong tail-risk protection characteristics despite experiencing negative long-run 
returns. Schwert (2011) found that negative stock returns are associated with elevated levels of 
volatility. Similarly, Israelov and Nielsen (2015) find that sharp and sudden losses in equity markets 
are normally associated with spikes in volatility, and these periods greatly benefit investors who are 
long volatility. During periods of market calm which represent the majority of trading days in the 
long-run, the authors suggest that investors who are short volatility benefit. 
 
Long VIX exposure offers similar protection to sharp equity losses as the purchase of put options - 
both are a bet that realized volatility will exceed implied volatility that is priced in by options markets. 
Thus, in the same way as the purchase of put options has been found by Israelov and Nielsen (2015) 
to be a drag on returns in the long-run despite high degrees of outperformance during periods of 
market crisis, Szado (2009) finds the same to be true of long VIX exposure. 
 
Simon and Campasano (2014) developed a trading strategy that tactically switches from long VIX 
futures contracts to short VIX futures contracts in an attempt to capture both the smaller but consistent 
returns associated with being short VIX futures contracts during calm market conditions for the 
majority of time, but also the larger return associated from being long VIX futures contracts during 
brief periods of market stress.  
 
The researchers used the VIX futures basis which describes the difference between the price of VIX 
futures contract and the spot price of the VIX as their long or short signal. That is, at the beginning 
of each trading day, if the VIX futures curve was sufficiently upward sloping (in contango), VIX 
futures contracts were shorted. If the VIX futures curve was downward sloping (in backwardation), 
the researchers went long VIX futures. This strategy resulted in substantial and significantly positive 
returns even after accounting for transaction fees. However, a great deal of the performance was 
attributable to the extraordinary returns derived from being long VIX futures during the 2008 GFC 
considering that the period under investigation ended in 2011.  
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This approach differs from capturing VRP using options in that the VRP is derived from the tendency 
for implied volatility to exceed realized volatility as a result of excess demand for options contracts. 
The premise of the trading strategy devised by Simon and Campasano (2014) is based on the findings 
of Mixon (2007) and Nossman and Wilhemsson (2009) which found the forecast power of the VIX 
futures basis for changes in future VIX prices to be insignificant.  
 
The implication of this lack of forecasting power found by Mixon (2007) and Nossman and 
Wilhemsson (2009) is that assuming the VIX futures curve is in contango, then because the VIX spot 
price does not tend to rise to the level of the futures price over the period, and given that the VIX 
futures price must converge to the VIX spot price upon settlement, the VIX futures price would have 
to fall to the level at which the VIX spot price is at. The researchers found that VIX futures basis has 
a significant forecast power of changes in VIX futures price changes, which presented a profitable 
trading opportunity for shorting VIX futures contracts when the VIX futures basis was in contango, 
and going long VIX futures contracts when the VIX futures basis was in backwardation.The key 
benefit offered by this approach is that while option-selling strategies are systematically short 
volatility, the VIX futures strategy is both short volatility and long volatility. This should in theory 
result in short volatility exposure most of the time according to the results of Simon and Campasano 
(2014), with occasional switches into long volatility exposure to profit from falls in equity associated 
with realized volatility exceeding implied volatility.  
 
Using daily data from 2006 to 2011, Simon and Campasano (2014) found that the VIX futures curve 
with respect to the front-month contract was in contango 68.10% of the time and in backwardation 
31.90% of the time. When the VIX price was less than 30% which represented 80.58% of the time 
during the period under investigation, the majority of the observations were found to be in contango. 
When the VIX price was between 30% and 40%, observations were evenly distributed, and when the 
VIX price was greater than 40% which only represented 9.24% of the time, the majority of 
observations were in backwardation. Periods of backwardation seemed to be clustered specifically 
during the GFC when markets experienced highly elevated VIX levels causing investors to perhaps 
price in some degree of mean-reversion with lower VIX futures prices relative to VIX spot prices. 
 
The nature of the return stream derived from this approach is fairly clear: when the VIX futures basis 
was in contango, small and consistent daily returns were captured, and when the VIX futures basis 
was in backwardation, large gains were captured. This is similar to characteristics of VRP where 
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small daily returns are captured on a daily basis as a result of being short implied volatility, the key 
difference is that when the VIX futures basis provides the signal, the VIX futures strategy attempts 
to profit from elevated levels of volatility by being long VIX futures as well. 
 
2.5 REDUCING EQUITY DOWNSIDE RISK 
 
The role of volatility in making asset allocation decisions from the position of an asset class that could 
replace or complement equity has so far been discussed. The next section outlines how volatility can 
be used to reduce equity drawdown risk without the use of derivatives (which may be restricted by 
some mandates) by regulating equity exposure with 3-month US T-bills. 
 
Asness (1996) showed that investors have benefited historically by favouring an approach of 
allocating some percentage of their portfolios to ‘safe-assets’ such as Treasury-bonds (bonds) due to 
their diversification benefits. For example, in a traditional 60/40 equity/bond portfolio, the inclusion 
of bonds is primarily intended to act as an offsetting return stream in the event of a crisis in equity 
markets. Since the effective US federal funds rate peaked at 22% at the end of 1980, investors have 
enjoyed somewhat of a tailwind in markets with rates trending downwards to zero post-GFC. This 
downward trend in rates allowed bonds to be significant contributors to portfolio returns over the 
period, while still maintaining their characteristic of being the asset of choice during ‘flight to quality’ 
events. Around 30% of all bonds in the Barclays Global Aggregate Index currently trading with 
negative yields, including the 50-year Swiss government bond (Lewin, 2016). However, the 
contribution bonds will have in portfolios in the future is unclear. By purchasing a negative yielding 
bond, investors are locking in a guaranteed loss on their investment, despite this, investors still seek 
the protection that bonds provide in an equity crisis even though its effectiveness as part of a 60/40 
portfolio during market crashes such as the GFC has been found wanting (Lee, 2011).  
 
Rachel and Smith (2015) confirm that real interest rates around the world are currently starkly lower 
than they had been in the past. It is still possible for some equities to continue achieving returns 
similar to those enjoyed in the past due to higher cash flow expectations despite a lower growth 
environment. However, it is reasonable to suggest that the same simply cannot be said for the future 
long-run return contributions for bonds given such extraordinarily low interest rates in developed 
markets, and limited ability to decrease rates further.  
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Beber, Brandt and Kavajecz (2009) find that in times of market stress, investors move capital from 
more risky assets to bonds due to a demand for liquidity. As the purpose of including developed 
market sovereign bonds in portfolios is first and foremost its historically proven attractiveness 
particularly in times of economic crisis, it stands to reason that if equity drawdown risk can be reduced 
without coming at the expense of significant drags on return, the reliance placed on bond exposure 
which is likely to underperform may be tapered. Thus, if the theory of secular stagnation holds, and 
long-run developed market sovereign bond returns turn out to be zero or perhaps even negative, then 
it follows that reducing equity drawdown risk implies less reliance on bond exposures. 
 
Reducing equity drawdown risk is not an easy task. The introduction of derivative markets has 
allowed investors to hedge exposures by purchasing instruments such as options contracts to place an 
explicit limit on the losses that could potentially be incurred. Such protection has been restrictively 
expensive (Israelov & Nielsen, 2015).  
 
An even simpler approach to reducing equity drawdown risk is to hold less equity. However, the aim 
of reducing equity drawdown risk should not be to eliminate volatility in its entirety, as investors 
enjoy upside volatility and wish to be compensated for accepting downside volatility in the long-run 
(Ang, Chen & Xing, 2006). Instead, the aim should be to explore strategies to systematically reduce 
exposure to the catastrophic impact brought about by tail-events that not only negatively impact 
portfolio returns, but also pose significant business risk to asset management firms who may 
experience a drain of assets under management caused by client withdrawals in often the most 
inopportune of times.  
 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) suggests that higher levels of risk would need to be accepted 
if higher levels of expected returns were desired. The implication of accepting more risk in pursuit of 
higher returns is increased exposure to risky assets that have historically experienced some periods 
of underperformance, and occasionally suffered severe drawdowns brought about by ‘black swan’ 
events (Taleb, Goldstein, & Spitznagel, 2009). ‘Black swan’ events are low probability events that 
generally have a high impact on the left tail of return distributions, and are impossible to predict 
(Taleb, Goldstein, & Spitznagel, 2009).  
 
World markets are more connected than ever, with ever-greater interdependence largely brought 
about by globalization. Countries around the world have largely embraced the open economy model, 
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significantly improving global economic conditions (Feachem, 2001). A cost of this success is the 
contagion between markets. It is entirely possible that a seemingly isolated crisis in one country 
affects other countries in significant ways. An example of this is the GFC which initially affected the 
real estate market in the US, but in a rapidly began affecting the entire economy and soon became a 
global crisis with many countries still recovering from it (Aloui, Aïssa & Nguyen, 2011). These 
‘butterfly effects’ are part of the reason that led Taleb, Goldstein and Spitznagel (2009) to favour 
preparation over prediction. That is, instead of allocating resources to predicting such events, which 
by their very nature are impossible to predict, rather allocate resources to limit their impact when they 
inevitably occur. 
 
All investors should consider the need to reduce both the frequency and magnitude of tail-events 
particularly with regard to equity in order to improve long-run performance, and there exists various 
approaches that have been documented to meet this need each with their own benefits and pitfalls. 
Various methods will be investigated below using a framework developed by Chee (2015) who 
classified tail-risk management strategies into those that provide explicit downside protection by 
eliminating the left tail of the distribution of outcomes, and those that attempt to redesign the 
distributions of outcomes. An approach or combination of approaches that maximize equity 
drawdown protection while minimizing the reduction of expected return is preferred ceterus parabis 
given that the probability of strong long-run performance is increased.  
 
2.5.1 Explicit downside hedges 
 
Explicit downside hedges such as purchasing put options or VIX futures allow investors to truncate 
downside risk. While the cost of these strategies often disallows them to become a permanent feature 
of portfolios, they do not affect the strategic asset allocation decision, that is, do not alter the shape 
of potential return distributions by changing the target weightings assigned to each asset within a 
portfolio. The reason for this is that these derivatives are overlays onto existing positions, rather than 
new allocations that require portfolio adjustments. Instead, they are used to eliminate the risk of 
suffering losses beyond a certain level while still accepting the uncertainty brought about by the 
investors choice of asset allocation. 
 
• Purchasing put options 
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A protective put is made up of a long position in an underlying instrument together with a long 
position in a put contract on the underlying instrument (Santa-Clara & Saretto, 2009). This provides 
the option holder with an exact level of downside protection in exchange for a premium, as the 
investor has the option to sell the underlying instrument should its price fall below the strike price 
and thus only participate in a certain amount of the downside (Geske & Johnson, 1984).  
 
Figlewski, Chidambaran and Kaplan (1993) investigate the performance of various protective put 
strategies which involve holding a long position in the underlying stock together with the purchase 
of put option protection. The authors found that the strategy did not perform as well as expected 
historically suggesting that when markets are forecasted to earn relatively low returns, it may be more 
beneficial to simply sell the underlying stock and hold cash as opposed to buy put protection on it. 
The expensiveness of put options has also been established by Evans, Geczy, Musto and Reed (2009), 
Israelov and Klein (2015) and Ge (2016). 
 
Arnott (1998) suggests that the use of put options as instruments used for portfolio insurance have 
issues that require consideration. First, the author found that the expensiveness of put options may 
alter the level of moneyness that investor can realistically insure at. Second, in the case of long-term 
investors, the arbitrary time-horizons at which put options expire are not aligned with the investment 
time-horizon. Third, given that premium needs to be paid to attain put option protection, less 
weighting can be given to other assets within the investor’s portfolio.  
 
Israelov and Nielsen (2015) evaluated a protective put strategy on the S&P 500 Index that involved 
the purchase of 5% out-the-money put options on a monthly basis. While the strategy proved 
successful during the sudden shocks in return, improving downside beta and portfolio volatility as 
compared to the volatility of the index, it achieved approximately half of the excess return attained 
by the index. Furthermore, while the index experienced a Sharpe ratio of 0.37, the strategy was only 
able to achieve a Sharpe ratio of 0.12. Not only was the excess return significantly lower, but the 
strategy proved to be considerably less efficient than simply holding the index, implying that the cost 
of holding the put options clearly went unrewarded. 
 
• Purchasing VIX futures  
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VIX futures are exchange-traded contracts based on the future level of the VIX Index (Zhang & Zhu, 
2006). In terms of the relationship between the spot price (VIX Index) and the futures price (VIX 
futures), literature has some mixed results. Simon and Campasano (2014) found that the VIX futures 
basis has a poor forecasting power on future VIX Index changes. However, Shu and Zhang (2012) 
find that VIX futures prices tend to lead the VIX Index implying that VIX futures market may have 
some price-discovery function.  
 
The phenomenon of falling stock prices being associated with rising levels of realized volatility was 
discussed in Black (1976), that found a negative correlation between stock returns and their volatility 
level particularly during periods of market stress. Modigliani and Miller (1958) stated that securities 
issued by the firm in order to raise capital (debt or equity) are merely different ways of dividing the 
ownership of the firm. Based on this principle, Black and Scholes (1973) linked market volatility to 
the underlying capital structure of firms, as holders of bonds issued by firms have a claim on the 
firm's value equal to the face value of their bonds, a decrease in the market value of a firm influences 
the degree of leverage on its capital structure, with this increased leverage resulting in rising implied 
as well as realized volatility. This phenomenon has since been referred to as the “leverage effect”, 
and presents a case where being long volatility (expecting realized volatility to exceed implied 
volatility) may offer protection during a crisis.  
 
Today, VIX futures contracts exist which can be used to provide investors with such directional 
exposure to volatility. Long VIX futures exposure offer a positive payoff profile when there is a rise 
in volatility usually caused by falls in equity prices. This negative correlation with equity returns was 
found to be historically reliable by Simon and Campasano (2014). Szado (2009) compared the use of 
long put options on the S&P 500 Index to long VIX exposure and concluded that holding the long 
VIX exposure could have provided improved protection as compared to put options during the GFC. 
Consistent with the findings of long put options, the author notes that long VIX exposure has 
historically resulted in negative returns. This is not surprising given the evidence already presented 
that showed that providers of protection require a premium to insure purchasers of protection.  
 
2.5.2 Approaches that re-shape the distribution of outcomes 
 
The following approaches attempt to reduce uncertainty by condensing the left side of the return 
distribution thereby implicitly reducing both the frequency and magnitude of drawdowns. Whilst the 
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cost of implementing such approaches are substantially lower than explicit downside hedges like 
option-buying strategies; investors achieve the change in distribution only by manipulating strategic 
asset allocation, which may, in the long-run affect how investors perform relative to their mandates. 
 
• Diversification 
 
Markowitz (1952) is considered to be the father of Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) and provided a 
mean-variance framework which is still widely used by investment professionals to describe the risk 
and return profile of any portfolio.  Markowitz (1952) separates the process of portfolio selection into 
2 stages, the first being the use of experience and observation to postulate the future performance of 
assets, the second takes those assumptions and uses them for portfolio selection. The first-order 
moment under consideration for a portfolio is expected return which describes the expected 
percentage increase in the value of an asset from one period to the next. The second-order moment 
under the framework is standard deviation which is the proxy for describing the risk profile of an 
investment. 
 
Standard deviation is a measure of the variability of the distribution of returns around its mean. Under 
normal circumstances, researchers analyze only a sample of returns as opposed to the entire 
population. Thus, sample statistics which are considered to be unbiased estimators of the true 
population are calculated.  
 
Markowitz (1952) assumes that investors are risk-averse, that is, investors prefer less risk to greater 
risk ceteris paribus, and thus desire the lowest risk possible for a given level of expected return, and 
inversely the highest expected return possible for a given level of risk. Efficient portfolios, therefore, 
are those who have the highest possible expected return per unit of standard deviation, or 
alternatively, the lowest possible standard deviation per unit of expected return. The author links all 
possible combinations of these efficient portfolios on a mean-variance framework, with the resulting 
curve known as the efficient frontier.  
 
Building on the framework established by Markowitz (1952), Tobin (1958) established the separation 
theorem adding US Treasury Bills (T-bills) as a proxy for cash to the mean-variance framework. 
Tobin (1958) established a premise that T-bills are a risk-free asset and thus plot on the mean-variance 
framework directly on the expected return axis. By drawing a straight-line tangent to the most north-
30 
 
westerly point of the efficient frontier from the risk-free rate on the expected return axis, the Capital 
Market Line (CML) was created.   
 
The implication of the CML is that only a single optimal portfolio exists, as opposed to the many 
efficient portfolios on the efficient frontier. Thus, if investors are unable to accept the risk implied by 
the position of the tangent portfolio, an allocation to the riskless asset could be mixed with the tangent 
portfolio such that risk can be reduced while still maintaining the highest possible expected return. 
Similarly, if a higher level of risk is desired, instead of being long cash (lending) together with some 
exposure to the tangent portfolio, investors can be short cash (borrow) together with some exposure 
to the tangent portfolio such that the highest possible expected return is achieved per unit of risk. 
 
There exists a trade-off between risk and expected return where an increase in expected return can 
generally only come about by accepting higher levels of standard deviation as the inherent cost. The 
high degree of volatility brought about by holding only a single security in a portfolio however, is not 
necessarily rewarded with a high expected return. Sharpe (1964) suggests that a portfolio’s risk can 
be divided into unsystematic and systematic risk. Unsystematic risk cannot be reduced, however, 
systematic risk can be diversified away. Specifically, the author explained that diversification allows 
investors to eliminate the idiosyncratic risk of each individual security, thereby reducing overall 
portfolio risk without necessarily reducing expected return. Risk-adjusted returns can therefore be 
improved at a zero explicit cost by diversifying within asset classes only if expected returns are not 
perfectly correlated.  
 
The risk reduction benefits of diversification can best be explained with an example of a 2 stock 
portfolio. Assuming that a portfolio consists only of a single stock ABC, then the volatility of the 
portfolio is simply equal to that of ABC. If the investor adds stock XYZ to ABC and places an even 
amount of cash in each assuming the standard deviations of ABC and XYZ are 20% and 10% 
respectively, with covariance equal to 0.017, then the portfolio volatility is equal to 14.49%. Based 
on this simple example, it is clear that assets should not be chosen only on the merit of their own risk 
and return characteristics, but also on how the asset move behave in conjunction to others within a 
portfolio.  
 
Diversification benefits are felt even more when investors additionally diversify across asset classes. 
To illustrate this, if instead of stock XYZ, bond AAA was added to ABC with equal allocations, and 
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bond AAA had a standard deviation of 7% with the covariance between the two being -0.0042, then 
the portfolio volatility would reduce to 9.55%. Diversifying geographies over and above diversifying 
within and across asset class would further benefit risk reduction given the addition of even more 
imperfectly correlated return streams, however, it is important to note that correlations are not fixed 
and may change unfavourably during a crisis for example, where correlations may converge due to a 
sell-off across all asset classes when liquidity is needed, rendering diversification ineffective. 
 
The benefits of diversification arise as the idiosyncratic risk of any single asset as a proportion of 
total risk decreases as the number of imperfectly correlated assets are added to a portfolio, until the 
portfolio risk as a whole consists almost entirely of systematic risk which is undiversifiable. The 
universe of investable asset classes is limited, and the introduction of an additional imperfectly 
correlated return stream in the form of volatility risk premium has been shown by many authors such 
as Rennison and Pedersen (2012) and Grant, Gregory and Lui (2007) to be beneficial to investors’ 
portfolios in the long-run. 
 
It has been observed that the benefits of diversification seem to break down when the correlations of 
asset classes converge during tail-events (Baur & Lucey, 2010). The reasons for sell-offs in even 
‘safe’ assets during tail-events are many, but not all investors who participate in sell-offs are doing 
so out of choice. Some investors may hold geared long positions, which may need to have 
maintenance margins topped up during a tail-event forcing these investors to liquidate even ‘safe’ 
assets such as bonds. Fund managers may experience ‘bank runs’, and may be compelled by mandate 
to hold a certain strategic asset allocation and will need to sell-off exposures across the board to 
maintain their target asset allocation. Thus, while diversification is still a wise and effective approach 
to managing the frequency of drawdowns, it may not be as effective in reducing the magnitude of 
drawdowns when correlations converge (Baur & Lucey, 2009). What follows is a brief summary of 
various asset classes that have historically been viewed as diversifiers. 
 
o Sovereign bonds 
 
Sovereign bonds are debt securities issued by sovereign nations that carry a credit rating which is a 
function of the country’s default risk (Kliger & Sarig, 2000). Sovereign nations have the ability to 
issue bonds denominated in their own currency as well as that of a physical currency such as the US 
Dollar which may be more attractive to international investors not looking to be exposed to currency 
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risk (Burnside, Eichenbaum & Rebelo, 2006). The credit rating on the debt denominated in the 
country’s local currency is often greater than its Dollar-denominated debt given the state’s ability to 
print more local currency in order to service debt repayments, as well as its capacity to collect taxes 
in its own currency to service debt (Burnside, Eichenbaum & Rebelo, 2006). The same cannot be said 
about its Dollar-denominated debt which is more volatile as its value is dependent on the appetite of 
foreign investors.  
 
Bonds offer returns in the form of income from periodic coupon payments, as well as capital growth 
which generally arises as a result of falls in interest rates. The issue investors face is that at the time 
of writing, around 30% of all bonds in the Barclays Global Aggregate Index have negative yields, up 
from 8% at the end of March 2015. This phenomenon is not unique to short-term debt, as Swiss 
government bond yields all the way up to 50-year maturities are trading in negative territory (Lewin, 
2016). Purchasing a bond with a negative yield and holding it to maturity will result in a loss on the 
investment, and if the tendency for an expanding universe of negative yielding bonds persists, their 
inclusion into future portfolios may be on account of their diversification benefits during a crisis 
alone.  
 
Chan, Treepongkaruna, Brooks and Gray (2011) found that US T-bond prices tend to have counter-
cyclical price movements, rising during regimes of economic recession, falling during regimes of 
economic expansion. When looking at periods that the researchers deemed to be ‘crisis regimes’, 
associated with high levels of volatility and sharply negative equity returns, strong evidence pointed 
toward a ‘flight to quality’, wherein investors divested from risky assets in favour of US T-bonds in 
search of liquidity (Vayanos, 2004). ‘Flight to quality’ also refers to the fact that US T-bonds are 
backed by the full faith and credit of the US government, and are generally viewed as safe assets due 
to a low probability of default risk given the sovereign’s ability to both collect taxes and print more 
of its currency in order to fulfil its debt obligations. These findings are in line with those of Shiller 
and Beltratti (1992) who found that equities and bonds have historically exhibited negative co-
movement.  
 
The US Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) raised the target funds rate by 0.25% in December 
2015 for the first time since 2006, with further rate hikes expected by the market (Cox, 2015).  This 
combined with the growing negative yield environment offered by other developed market bonds 
may result in a negative long-run trendline contribution to balanced portfolios, however excluding 
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bonds altogether may come with significant consequences as it is still reasonable to expect a ‘flight 
to quality’ during tail-events, and may still offer positive returns if interest rates become even more 
negative. 
 
Svensson (2015) states that the US Federal Reserve has targeted approximately 2% inflation since 
the beginning of 2012. If achieved, would benefit the US government as the higher the level of 
inflation, the more debt servicing that needs to be committed gets wiped away (Krause & Moyen, 
2016). Therefore, the higher inflation is relative to prevailing yields, the more beneficial from the 
point of view of the borrower. Should real yields turn negative in the US in the same way as they 
have in many other developed nations, a case can still be made for the inclusion of bonds in balanced 
portfolios over and above their counter-balancing effect during an equity crisis provided bond 
exposure is attained with gearing using a futures contract for example. In this case, investors are short 
T-bills and long the T-bond position, and if it is assumed that the cost of gearing is 0.50% and the 
yield on a US 30-year T-bill is 2.50%, then the yield differential is locked in what is known as positive 
carry (Acharya & Steffen, 2015). While positive carry has been enjoyed in the past, it is not a given 
and may be eroded with a flattening of the yield curve or a significant enough price movement.  
 
Should secular stagnation theory as posited by Summers (2013) hold, it is assumed that an economy 
needs a low R* in order to operate normally, with a relatively flat yield curve implied by the 
stagnation being secular. In this case, if inflation is near its target level, investors who hold geared 
bond positions may suffer even more than regular bond investors in that not only would they 
experience low or even negative real yields, but low or even negative carry depending on their cost 
of gearing, amplifying portfolio detraction. As pointed out by Summers (2013), it is reasonable to 
expect interest rates to be forcefully kept low on account of sheer demand for safe assets globally, 
particularly by central banks. The need for additional risk management tools to complement bonds is 
thus not only justified but imperative to long-run performance. 
 
o Gold 
 
Gold has historically been considered a ‘safe-haven’ asset class favoured by investors during times 
of severe economic uncertainty. A ‘safe haven’ asset may be defined as one who is uncorrelated or 
negatively correlated with another asset during market downturns (Baur & Lucey, 2010). According 
to the authors, ‘safe haven’ assets are differentiated from hedges in that hedges display negative or 
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no correlation with another asset on average whereas ‘safe haven’ assets simply display positive but 
imperfect correlation with another asset on average.  
 
In their study, Baur and Lucey (2010) found that gold is indeed a ‘safe haven’ asset and perform best 
when equity holders need them the most: during market turmoil. The authors suggested that a reason 
for the popularity of gold during periods of market stress is that it has long been considered a store of 
value, a characteristic that may also explain why the metal is also seen as an inflation hedge. Gold 
has also been used a medium of exchange for significantly longer than fiat money and, unlike fiat 
money, it is finite and adding to its supply requires considerably more effort than a printing press. 
 
Ciner (2001) suggests that the demand for gold stems both from central banks who seek to maintain 
a consistent level of the precious metal as a part of their foreign exchange reserves, as well as its use 
in jewelry which is manufactured in the private sector. While the benefits of holding gold during a 
downturn appear to be consistent, it is important to note that gold does not have a cash flow stream. 
Instead, gains and losses are capital of nature and therefore may not offer steady returns over time.  
 
o Commodities 
 
Commodity returns come in the form of capital growth as opposed to a stream of cash flows and are 
thus not directly influenced by a rise in interest rates in the same direct way that bonds are, but rather 
by changes in supply and demand. A basket of commodities across energy, grains, industrial metals, 
precious metals, soft metals and livestock offer investors the diversification benefits of an imperfectly 
correlated return stream, and has been shown to increase portfolio risk-adjusted returns (Georgiev, 
2001). Further advantages of holding commodities including being a hedge against inflationary 
episodes as well as having a positive roll yield during periods of high spot price volatility if exposure 
is attained through the use of futures contracts (Georgiev, 2001).  
 
Should secular stagnation theory hold and lower global economic growth rates become the norm, it 
is reasonable to expect that lower commodity prices be the norm as well. The supply of commodities 
is relatively sticky as supply has historically taken a long time to match demand (Canuto, 2014).  
Additionally, other reasons that explain why the supply of commodities is sticky include significant 
initial capital outlays required, high storage costs and production quotas. Thus, it follows that the 
price fluctuations in the short-run are widely influenced by demand. Therefore, with lower economic 
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growth driving the demand for infrastructure, raw materials and energy down, lower commodity 
prices may be the result. From an asset allocation point of view, commodities may not offer the 
diversification benefits needed during protracted periods of low growth and thus their pro-cyclical 
nature may actually detract from returns.  
 
o Property 
 
Property returns come in the form of both income stemming from rental income as well as capital 
gains from the appreciation of property values. Not only does this asset class offer diversification 
benefits as shown by Stevenson (2000), but has historically been a partial hedge against inflation 
given that many rental contracts have clauses that link periodic rent increases to inflation (Linnack 
and Ward, 1988). Property tends to exhibit similar behavior to equities during periods of market 
stress, generally experiencing negative returns (Chan, Treepongkaruna, Brooks, & Gray, 2011). 
When combined in a traditional 60/40 equity/bond portfolio, Hoesli, Lekander and Witkiewicz (2004) 
show that real estate has historically contributed to absolute return levels as well as offering downside 
diversification to the traditional mix. 
 
o Managed volatility trading rule 
 
Spikes in volatility are generally associated with low stock returns. Schwert (2011) investigated the 
realized volatility of stock returns during the most prolific crisis’ since the 20th century including the 
Great Depression, the Flash Crash of 1987 and the GFC and found that high levels of volatility are a 
common thread throughout these and other periods of crisis. Chan, Treepongkaruna, Brooks and Gray 
(2011) similarly find that crisis regimes are characterized by high levels of volatility and severe 
drawdowns in equity returns.  
 
Equity correlations and equity volatility tend to move together, and thus low volatility periods tend 
to allow for the benefits of diversification to be enjoyed, while periods of high volatility may see the 
convergence of correlations and the weakening of diversification effects (Andersen, Bollerslev, 
Diebold, & Ebens, 2001). Engle (2001) found that market volatility is not static, but rather changes 
over time in a manner that is not indicative of randomness. Hill (2011) concurs with the non-random 
nature of changes in volatility finding a relatively higher level of positive autocorrelation in the 
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volatility of the S&P 500 Index than S&P 500 Index returns, suggesting that longer term risk is often 
preceded by short-term rises in volatility.  
 
Investors accept risk in the expectation that they will be compensated for doing so. However the 
premise behind a managed volatility approach is that this expectation is not necessarily met. Collie, 
Sylvanus and Thomas (2011) also found that changes in equity volatility are more persistent than 
changes in returns and have some explanatory power on subsequent realized volatility.  
 
The persistence and explanatory power of recent realized volatility may assist investors understanding 
the prevailing level of volatility, and could act as proxy. If the prevailing rate is currently at a high 
level, then it stands to reason that investors should reduce equity exposure, and if the prevailing level 
of volatility is low then investors should increase equity exposure if the above findings hold. The 
managed volatility approach postulates that by changing the shape of the portfolio distribution to fully 
participate in equity markets when markets are relatively calm, and to reduce participation when 
markets are in turmoil will result in more stable portfolio performance brought about by less portfolio 
volatility.  
 
To test this hypothesis,  Collie, Sylvanus and Thomas (2011) devised a simple trading rule that used 
recent realized volatility as the proxy for the prevailing level of volatility and set three volatility 
regimes: equity was given a maximum allocation during low volatility regimes, with allocations 
reduced during medium volatility regimes and reduced further during high volatility regimes. Not 
only did the trading rule result in less portfolio volatility when compared to the index, but actually 
delivered a higher annualized return after accounting for transaction costs. In terms of tail-risk, the 
trading rule appeared to reduce the depth of the most severe drawdowns, as well as reduce the time 
until recovery, all the while having a similar effective exposure to equity as the buy-and-hold 
portfolio. 
 
While the findings of Collie, Sylvanus and Thomas (2011) seem impressive, it is prudent to assume 
that not every kind of tail-event is represented in past data. Thus an event that results in a sudden 
market crash without being preceded by high levels of volatility will render the trading rule 
ineffective. In this event, diversifying specifically with sovereign bonds may offer imperfect 
correlation with falling equity prices and justify their inclusion into portfolios with short-run 
outperformance being experienced when needed most. 
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2.5.3 Measures of tail-risk  
 
Drawdowns are a simple and visually effective means to illustrate the magnitude of a decline in the 
value of a portfolio from its highest point. While drawdowns may be a useful proxy for risk in that 
they provide information of the severity of tail-events in the past, it is helpful to compare the 
distributional properties of strategies with one another. The most commonly used proxy for risk is 
volatility which is a measure of the variability of the distribution of returns around its mean, however 
past research has been highly critical of volatility as a proxy for risk.  
 
Value-at-Risk (VaR) is a risk measure that quantifies potential financial losses given the probability 
of such potential losses occurring and a specific time-frame within which they could occur, and 
Sarykalin, Serraino and Uryasev (2008) found VaR to be superior to volatility. Rockafellar and 
Uryasev (2002) were, however, critical of VaR given that it relies on returns being normally 
distributed, making the measure unreliable when returns exhibit some other distribution and sub-
optimal as it does not indicate the actual extent of losses that might be incurred beyond the threshold 
amount. The researchers suggested that the use of VaR creates a bias toward optimism instead of the 
conservatism given that VaR serves simply to provide the lowest bound for losses in the tail of the 
loss distribution. 
 
The authors suggested that the use of Conditional-Value-at-Risk (CVaR) to measure financial risk is 
a more appropriate alternative to the use of VaR. CVaR is an extension of VaR and attempts to place 
a value of the expected loss an investor can expect if a tail-event was to occur, as it measures the 
probability of a specific loss exceeding the VaR at a defined confidence level.  
 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
 
The theory of secular stagnation predicts that lower growth rates will be achieved in the future relative 
to what had been achieved in the past. The path to normalizing interest rates from historically low 
levels adds to the already challenging economic environment faced by traditional assets such as bonds 
and equity. Past research has indicated that volatility exposure has improved the risk-adjusted 
performance of traditional portfolios, and has also generated competitive absolute returns when 
compared to equity. The addition of an additional absolute return engine into traditional portfolios is 
not guaranteed to resolve the challenge posed by secular stagnation. However, the diversification 
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benefits derived from the addition of volatility as an asset class has been shown by past research not 
only to benefit downside risk, but also absolute return. Past research has been reviewed to cater for 
investors who are precluded from attaining volatility exposure, and who may need to increase equity 
exposure to reduce the risk of underperformance from an absolute return point of view. Specifically, 
literature has indicated that similar absolute returns as passively holding the S&P 500 Index can be 
generated with a volatility-responsive trading rule that regulates equity exposure according to the 
prevailing level of volatility. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
             DATA & METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 3 initially describes each data set used in this study and offers justification as to their 
inclusion. Then, the methodology used in this dissertation is described in two sections: first, the 
methodology used to explore volatility exposure as an asset class, and second, as a signal to reduce 
equity drawdown risk. First, in terms of volatility exposure as an asset class, three approaches will be 
investigated: option-selling strategies that are short volatility in a systematic fashion, a bull put spread 
strategy that is net-short volatility and has an explicit floor on losses, and a long and short VIX futures 
trading rule. Being systematically short volatility using option-selling strategies is investigated due 
to the tendency for implied volatility (being sold) to exceed realized volatility resulting in a positive 
aggregate net premium on average over time. The VIX futures trading rule differs from this approach 
in that it relies on the empirically bad forecasting power of the VIX futures basis to predict changes 
in the spot VIX that in turn present profitable trading opportunities. This strategy also differs from 
option-selling strategies in that it has dynamic allocations and is therefore more sensitive to 
measurement error. Second, in terms of the potential use of volatility as a forward indicator, a trading 
strategy that uses the prevailing level of volatility (as described by recent realized volatility) as a 
signal to regulate equity exposure will be explored.  
 
3.2 DATA 
 
3.2.1 Data used to explore volatility as an asset class 
 
Table 2 below summarizes the data used for the investigation on volatility as an asset class, both 
independently, and as part of 30/30/40 volatility/equity/bond portfolio. Historical closing implied 
volatility data for at-the money (ATM), 5% and 10% out-the-money (OTM) S&P 500 Index put 
options are used to compute historical option premiums used in the option-selling strategies as well 
as the bull put spread strategy investigated. The VIX futures strategy was developed using the VIX 
Index, VIX futures and E-mini S&P 500 Index futures prices. The iShares 20+ Year T-bond ETF was 
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used as a US T-bond proxy in the 30/30/40 volatility/equity/bond portfolios back tested in this 
dissertation. 
 
Closing prices were sourced from Bloomberg for each data set on a daily basis. The earliest data that 
could be sourced for historical S&P 500 Index implied volatilities started on the 21st of November 
2005, thus the CBOE S&P 500 PutWrite Index was also examined from the same date up to the 30th 
of June 2016. Our VIX futures price data began on the 26th of March 2004, thus closing VIX Index 
and E-mini S&P 500 Index futures prices were sourced from the same date up to the 30th of June 
2016. 
 
Table 2: Summary of data used for exploring volatility as an asset class 
Data Set Periodicity Start Date End Date Source 
VIX Index Daily 2004/03/26 2016/06/30 Bloomberg 
S&P 500 Index Put Option Implied 
Volatilities 
Daily 2005/11/21 2016/06/30 Bloomberg 
CBOE S&P 500 PutWrite Index Daily 2005/11/21 2006/06/30 Bloomberg 
VIX Futures Prices Daily 2004/03/26 2016/06/30 Bloomberg 
E-mini S&P 500 Futures Prices Daily 2004/03/26 2016/06/30 Bloomberg 
iShares 20+ Year Treasury Bond ETF Daily 2005/11/21 2016/06/30 Bloomberg 
 
The VIX Index proxies the implied volatility priced in by the market over a range of options on the 
underlying instrument over a 30-day period across varying degrees of moneyness. This makes equity 
volatility indices such as the VIX Index starkly different to standard equity indices as preceding 
observations are not reference points for subsequent observations, but are rather observed 
independently. In other words, while a growth of 1% on equity results in the index increasing from a 
base of 100 to 101 points, changes in market expectations of future volatility as proxied by the VIX 
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Index are not represented by increasing or decreasing an index value from the base of the previous 
period. That is, the expected future volatility of the S&P 500 Index as priced by options markets 
which may be 40 VIX points one day and 20 VIX points the next. The VIX Index is not a tradable 
instrument, however exposure can be attained through the use of derivative instruments such as 
options and futures contracts.  As a proxy for US equity implied volatility, VIX Index data is used. 
Other market equity volatility data was excluded from this study as the starting dates of these indices 
were too recent to justify fair comparison with US data.  
 
While the VIX Index is useful in that it condenses various implied volatilities into a single number, 
option strategies that are short near-the-money options are investigated, with the same maturity as the 
VIX.  Historical daily data on the end of day implied volatility levels of ATM, 5% OTM and 10% 
OTM S&P 500 Index put options are used. Daily implied volatility levels at each degree of moneyness 
listed above are used to compute the daily value of option premiums using the Black-Scholes options 
pricing model. The CBOE PutWrite Index is designed to track the performance of a fully 
collateralized portfolio that writes ATM put options on the S&P 500 Index with a 30-day maturity 
level and will be useful to compare the relative performances of the option-selling strategies 
investigated in this dissertation. 
 
VIX futures contracts are standardized futures contracts on the 30-day implied volatility of the S&P 
500 Index at the expiration date. For example, the price used to purchase a December VIX futures 
contract describes the 30-day implied volatility of the S&P 500 Index on the day that the December 
contract expires. Front-month VIX futures are those that have an expiration date closest to the current 
date. Second-month VIX futures are those that have an expiration second closest to the current date. 
VIX futures contracts expire 30-days before S&P 500 options contracts expire, which is on the third 
Friday of every month. Should either the third Friday of the month when S&P 500 options expire or 
the 30th day preceding this date (usually a Wednesday) when VIX futures contracts expire be a 
holiday, then VIX futures contracts will expire one day earlier than they otherwise would.  
 
The iShares 20+ Year T-bond ETF which seeks to track the performance of an index composed of 
US T-bonds with maturities greater than 20-years was used as a proxy for US T-bonds. Given that 
the performance of volatility in the long-run is investigated, it is deemed appropriate to use long-
dated bonds as part of the 30/30/40 volatility/equity/bond portfolio mix evaluated in this dissertation.  
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3.2.2 Data used to explore volatility as a signal to reduce equity drawdown risk 
 
Table 3 provides a summary of the equity index and US T-bill data used in this dissertation. S&P 500 
Index data is used as a proxy for the US equity market. The MSCI EAFE (Europe, Australasia and 
the Far East) Index is used to represent the developed world excluding the US and Canada. 
Developing markets are separated into the more advanced emerging markets and less advanced 
frontier markets as categorized by the MSCI EM Index and the MSCI Frontier Index respectively. 
Data for each index is sourced from their respective inception dates aside from the S&P 500 Index 
for matching purposes. Given that each equity index data set is based on closing USD prices, 3-month 
US T-Bill yields are used as a proxy for cash to calculate excess returns which are in turn used to 
compute Sharpe ratios, as well as a part of the return earned on fully collateralized portfolios.  
 
Table 3: Summary of equity and fixed income data 
Index Periodicity Start Date End Date Source 
S&P 500 Index Daily 1972/01/03 2016/06/30 Bloomberg 
MSCI EAFE Index Daily 1972/01/03 2016/06/30 Bloomberg 
MSCI EM Index Daily 1988/01/01 2016/06/30 Bloomberg 
MSCI FM Index Daily 2002/06/03 2016/06/30 Bloomberg 
3-Month US T-Bills Daily 1972/01/03 2016/06/30 Bloomberg 
 
3.3 METHODOLOGY 
 
3.3.1 Volatility strategies 
 
• Option-selling strategies 
 
The CBOE S&P 500 PutWrite Index is a proxy for a strategy that involves the sale of 1-month ATM 
S&P 500 Index put options that are fully collateralized with cash reserves earning money market 
rates. While using the index as a proxy for VRP may be simple, it is limited as it does not 
accommodate more conservative investors who would prefer to sell options that are further OTM (the 
sale of a 5% OTM option would exempt the option writer from loss up to the 5% level for example). 
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Simply modelling the CBOE S&P 500 PutWrite Index would also not allow the flexibility afforded 
by bull put spread strategies that explicitly cut tail-risk at predetermined levels.  
 
Four approaches to capture VRP will be investigated in this study and compared with the S&P 500 
Index. First, the CBOE S&P 500 PutWrite Index. Second, a strategy that simulates the sale of ATM 
S&P 500 Index put options. Third, a strategy that simulates the sale of 5% OTM S&P 500 put options. 
Fourth, a bull put spread strategy that simulates the simultaneous sale of ATM S&P 500 Index put 
options and purchase of 10% OTM S&P 500 Index put options.  
 
Bull put strategies are constructed by going short a put option and simultaneously going long another 
put option with a lower degree of moneyness with the same expiration date creating a payoff profile 
illustrated by figure 1 below. In figure 1, the strategy will simultaneously sell an S&P 500 Index 
option with strike price K2 and buy an S&P 500 Index option with the same expiration date with 
strike price K1 with a lower degree of moneyness thereby placing a floor on the maximum potential 
loss should a tail-event occur. The maximum profit of the strategy is the premium received for selling 
a put with strike price K2 minus the premium paid for buying a put with strike price K1. Given that 
that long position is at a lower level of moneyness than the short position, the trade remains a net 
short position, and thus a net profit appears to be the logical result over time as VRP is still captured. 
 
Figure 1: Bull put spread payoff profile 
 
 
Moneyness
L
o
ss
P
ro
fi
t
K1 K2
0
44 
 
The CBOE S&P 500 PutWrite Index sells new front-month ATM S&P 500 Index options on 
expiration date (after allowing the portfolio’s old options to expire) where the expiration date on S&P 
500 Index options are generally the third Friday of each month provided it does not fall on a US 
public holiday (in which case the expiration date is moved one day back). The S&P 500 Index put 
options that are simulated in each of the strategies under investigation differ from this approach as no 
option is allowed to expire. That is, at the end of each month, second-month S&P 500 Index put 
options contracts that generally have 6 to 7-weeks to expiry are sold. At the end of the following 
month, when these contracts have approximately 2 to 3-weeks to expiry, the options are closed and 
the new batch of second-month contracts are sold with the process continuing in the same fashion. 
For example, second-month options that would expire during April of 2016 would have been sold on 
the 29th of February 2016 when they had 46-days to expiry (analogous to the aforementioned 6 to 7-
week period). This position would then be closed on the 31st of March 2016 with 15 days left until 
expiration (similar to the aforementioned 2 to 3-week period) after which new second month options 
that would expire during May 2016 would be sold and so forth.  
 
The reason for this approach is so that the portfolio could be rebalanced at the end of each month i.e. 
the new options that are written are scaled to the level at which the portfolio was at the end of the 
month. Additionally, investors who write longer maturity options accept more risk than investors who 
write shorter maturity options all else equal given the greater time value associated with the longer 
maturity option. This higher risk should, in turn, raise expected returns slightly which is why second-
month options with 6 or 7 weeks to maturity are sold and closed out with 2 to 3-weeks to maturity as 
opposed to front month options as per the CBOE S&P 500 PutWrite Index. 
 
At the end of each month, the premiums earned by writing S&P 500 index put options (as well as 
premiums paid simultaneously in the case of the bull put spread strategy) will be calculated according 
to the option pricing model originally established by Black and Scholes (1973) given by the below 
equations.  
 
 P = 𝑁(−𝑑2)𝐾𝑒
−𝑟𝑡 − SN(−𝑑1)             (1) 
 
 
𝑑1 =
ln (
𝑆
𝐾) + (𝑟
𝑠2
2 ) 𝑡
𝑠×√𝑡
− 𝑁(𝑑2)𝐾𝑒
−𝑟𝑡 
            (2) 
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 d2 = 𝑑1 − 𝑠×√𝑡 (3) 
 
Where P is equal to the price of the put premium, S is equal to the current price of the S&P 500 Index, 
t is equal to time to exercise date, K is equal to strike price of the option, r is equal to the risk-free 
rate (assumed to be the 3-month US T-bill rate), N is equal to a cumulative normal distribution and s 
is current implied volatility.  
 
The calculated premiums should accurately simulate actual premiums given that ex-post implied 
volatility data was used for each relevant degree of moneyness with all other variables used in the 
options pricing model also known. During each day of the month, the value of open option positions 
is computed using the above equations so as to simulate a daily mark-to-market. All volatility 
strategies are assumed to be 100% collateralized. Thus, the return on cash as approximated by 3-
month US T-bill rates are also added to the portfolio, and an index starting at 100 for each strategy is 
created to ensure comparability.   
 
To measure the performance of each strategy, annualized holding period returns are calculated 
according to equation 4 below where Pt is the level of the index at the end of the period and Po is the 
level of the index at the beginning of the period. Drawdowns across the period were also calculated 
for each strategy with the formula given as equation 5 below where the drawdown denoted D(T) is 
equal to the minimum value between zero or the drawdown given by the current observation X(t) 
minus the historical peak of the time series denoted as X(T), where time T is the total time period 
from time t0 up to time t. 
 
 
Annualized Holding Period Return = (1 +
𝑃𝑇
𝑃0
)
365.25
𝑇−𝑡0 − 1 
(4) 
 
 𝐷(𝑇) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{0, 𝑋(𝑡) − max 𝑋(𝑇)} (5) 
 
In order to calculate and compare tail-risk measures of each strategy, equation 6 below describes the 
equation used to calculate VaR and equations 7 and 8 are the formulas used to calculate CVaR on a 
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daily basis, where X is equal to a random variable with the cumulative distribution function 
FX(z)=P{X≤z} and a is equal to the chosen confidence level.  
 
 𝑉𝑎𝑅(𝑋) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑧|𝐹𝑋(𝑧) ≥ 𝑎} (6) 
 
 
𝐶𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑎(𝑋) = ∫ 𝑧𝑑𝐹𝑋
𝑎(𝑧)
∞
−∞
 
(7) 
 
 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐹𝑋
𝑎(𝑧) = 0 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑧 < 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑎(𝑋) 𝑜𝑟 
𝐹𝑥(𝑧) − 𝑎
1 − 𝑎
 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑧
≥ 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑎(𝑋)  
 
(8) 
 
• VIX Futures Strategy 
  
The VIX futures strategy involves going short VIX futures if the current VIX futures basis is in 
contango and going long VIX futures if the VIX futures basis is in backwardation, delta-hedging 
positions on a monthly basis using E-mini S&P 500 Index futures.  At the end of each trading day, 
the VIX futures basis is calculated as per equation 9 as the difference between a rolling 30-day VIX 
implied futures closing price (calculated as a weighted average of the front and second-month 
contracts) and the closing price of the VIX. 
 
 
𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 = (𝑃𝐹𝑀× 
𝑇𝐹 − 𝑡
30
 +  𝑃𝑆𝑀 × 
30 − (𝑇𝐹 − 𝑡)
30
) − 𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑋 
(9) 
 
Where PFM is the closing price of the front month VIX future, TF-t is the days that the front month 
contract has until expiry, PSM is the closing price of the second-month VIX future, and PVIX is the 
closing price of the VIX. If the basis is positive, the futures curve is said to be in contango and thus 
a short signal is indicated for the following morning’s trade. If the basis is negative, the VIX futures 
curve is said to be in backwardation and thus a long signal is indicated for the following morning’s 
trade. Table 4 illustrates an example of this below. Given that the closing price of the VIX on the 28th 
of June 2016 was 18.75, and that closing price of the 30-day implied VIX future was 19.01, the basis 
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would be 0.26 which would mean that the futures curve was in contango indicating a short instruction 
at the beginning of the next day. 
 
Table 4: Basis calculation on 2016/06/28 
Instrument PClose TF-t Weight PWeighted PVIX Basis 
VIX FM Future 18.88 22 
22
30
 13.845 - - 
VIX SM Future 19.38 22 
8
30
 5.168 - - 
Total - - - 19.01 18.75 0.26 
 
Continuing with the established example, the US dollar (USD) profit/loss calculated at the end of the 
following day is calculated as the difference between the notional value of the closing front month 
VIX future and the notional value of the same opening front month VIX future. As the VIX futures 
curve is said to be in contango in the above example, the USD profit/loss for the day is simply 
multiplied by -1 as a short position would have been taken at the beginning of the day.  
 
In order to limit the impact that changes in the S&P 500 Index futures had on VIX futures, daily delta 
hedging is modeled. At the end of each day, the USD profit/loss on a single E-mini S&P 500 future 
is calculated as the difference between the notional values of the closing and opening front month E-
mini S&P 500 futures and similarly multiplying the answer by -1 if the VIX futures curve had been 
in contango at the close of the day before. Consider table 5 which illustrates how these calculations 
were done on the day following the short instruction established at the close of the 28th of June 2016. 
The VIX future closed at a lower price, thus because a short position would have been taken at the 
beginning of the trading day given the instruction calculated in table 4, a gain of $1525 is earned for 
the day. Similarly, although the E-mini S&P 500 future ended the day at a higher price, because a 
short trade would have been entered at the beginning of the day, a loss is incurred of $1925 resulting 
in a net loss of $400 for the day.  
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Table 5: Daily profit/loss on single futures contracts example on 2016/06/29 
Instrument 
Contract 
Unit 
POpen PClose NOpen NClose 
Daily 
Profit/Loss 
VIX FM 
Future 
1000 19 17.475 $19000 $17475 $1525 
E-Mini S&P 
500 FM 
Future 
50 2028.25 2066.75 $101413 $103338 -$1925 
 
To prevent frivolous trading, VIX futures are held either to expiry or until the VIX futures curve 
changes from its current state, i.e. if for 10 consecutive days the VIX futures curve is said to be in 
contango, and at the end of the 10th day it is said to have changed into backwardation, the short 
positions in both the VIX futures and E-Mini S&P 500 futures would close and new long positions 
would open at the beginning of the 11th day. If the VIX futures curve does not change states, positions 
are maintained, and thus daily USD profit/loss will simply be calculated as the difference between 
the closing notional values of the previous day and the closing notional values of the present day for 
both VIX and E-mini S&P 500 front month futures (multiplied by -1 if in contango state). 
 
In order to adequately delta hedge positions, a ratio of the number of VIX futures contracts to E-mini 
S&P 500 futures contracts is estimated given large differences in national values. This hedge ratio is 
calculated at the end of each month according to equation 10 below. 
 
 
𝐻𝑅𝑡 =
100,000
𝑁𝑆&𝑃
 
(10) 
 
Where HRt is equal to the hedge ratio calculated at the end of the month, NS&P is equal to the notional 
value of an E-mini S&P 500 front-month futures contract at the end of the month. The reasoning 
behind this estimation is a theoretical upper bound for the VIX of 100 is assumed (this is not so in 
reality as the VIX is not constrained by an upper bound, but a theoretical one is set for modelling 
purposes that cannot be dismissed as impossible given the fact that 80.86 is the all-time highest close 
for the VIX which occurred on 20 November 2008). Thus, the notional value of what is deemed to 
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be the theoretical upper bound of the VIX is 100,000 (100 VIX points multiplied by 1000 contract 
units), divided by the current notional value of the E-mini S&P 500 future would result in the number 
of E-mini S&P 500 futures contracts to hold for every VIX futures contracts held. 
 
For example, on 30 June 2016, the E-mini S&P 500 front month future’s notional value was $104,513, 
using equation 2, the hedge ratio would be equal to 0.96. Assuming that the VIX futures curve was 
in contango at the end of 30 June 2016, this would imply shorting 0.96 E-mini S&P 500 front month 
futures and shorting 1 VIX front month future at the beginning of 1 July 2016 and maintain the same 
ratio for the entire month regardless of the direction of trades. For simplicity, it is assumed that E-
mini S&P 500 front month futures can be traded in decimals. 
 
Total USD profit/loss for each day is then calculated by multiplying the number of contracts held by 
the USD profit/loss on a single contract for both VIX and E-mini S&P 500 front month futures. The 
total daily USD profit/loss together with the daily return on cash (given that index is assumed to be 
100% collateralized) as represented by the 3-month US T-bill is then converted into an index. The 
risk and returns characteristics of the index is then compared with equity using equations 4 to 8 
together with other statistical measures. 
 
3.3.2 Managed volatility trading rule 
 
• The relationship between volatility and subsequent return 
 
Similar to past research, before a managed volatility trading rule can be developed, it must firstly be 
determined whether investors are efficiently rewarded for participating in markets with heightened 
volatility. Volatility is defined as standard deviation which is a measure of the variability of the 
distribution of returns around its mean, and is calculated daily using equation 11 (assuming a 252-
day US trading year). 
 
 
𝑠 = √
∑ (𝑅t −
𝑇
𝑡=1 ?̅?)
𝑛 − 1
 
(11) 
 
50 
 
Correlation is a standardized measure of co-movement and is calculated as the covariance between 2 
assets divided by the product of each assets’ standard deviation as shown in equation 12 below. The 
correlation coefficient is bounded between -1 and +1, a -1 coefficient implies a perfectly negative 
correlation, +1 implies perfectly positive correlation and a correlation of zero implies the absence of 
any linear relationship. 
 
 
𝜌1,2 =
𝐶𝑜𝑣1,2
𝑠1𝑠2
 
 
(12)  
The association between negative returns and highly volatile periods are established by Israelov and 
Nielsen (2015), however, should the returns after such periods not sufficiently compensate investors 
for their acceptance of such risk, it stands to reason that risk-averse investors should opt for less risky 
assets until volatility has subsided. Past research has confirmed that investors experienced 
disappointing returns following volatile periods when recorded over longer periods (monthly and 
quarterly). In order to investigate whether the above holds true in the short-run also, the data for each 
market is divided into periods of 10-trading days (analogous to a 2-week period), after which 
annualized standard deviations are calculated for each such period, then the return for the 10-trading 
days following each respective period is recorded.  
 
For example, figure 2 below shows how the standard deviation at time t is calculated for the 10-
trading days that preceded time t, following which the HPR for the 10-trading days following time t 
is recorded as the matching return. Each 10-trading day period is then organized into ascending order 
according to their volatility, and then categorized into deciles (given as y) according to equation 13 
below.  
 
Figure 2: Determining the relationship between volatility and subsequent returns 
 
time ttime t-1 time t+1
10-trading days preceding time t used to 
calculate annualized 10-trading day 
volatility at time t
10-trading day HPR calculated from 
time t until time t+1
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 L𝑦 = (𝑛 + 1)
𝑦
100
 (13) 
 
Where Ly is equal to the position of the desired decile and n is equal to the number of observations. 
For example, if only 99 periods are investigated (n), the upper bound of the first decile (L10) would 
simply be the 10th lowest standard deviation given that n=99 and y=10. An investigation into 
subsequent returns is then conducted with average HPRs at time t+1 calculated for each decile as well 
as for each data set as a whole. In order to better understand the distribution of returns per decile both 
the 5th and 95th percentiles of each individual return decile is also calculated, for example, the 5th 
percentile (L5) would be the 5
th lowest HPR assuming that 100 HPRs were organized in ascending 
order. 
 
It stands to reason that investors should be rewarded for accepting higher risk. Thus one would expect 
HPRs in deciles categorized by high volatility to be significantly higher than the average HPR across 
all deciles. Should this not necessarily be the case, however, it follows that higher risk-adjusted 
returns could be achieved by only participating in markets during periods of low volatility. In order 
to determine whether mean returns across each decile (?̅?𝑑) differed significantly from the mean return 
across all deciles (?̅?), a 2-tail paired t-test was performed with an alpha of 0.05 according to equation 
14 below was conducted across the markets under investigation. 
 
 H0: ?̅?𝑑 = ?̅? 
H𝑎: ?̅?𝑑 ≠ ?̅? 
(14) 
 
• Managed volatility trading rule 
 
Under the premise that investors are not adequately rewarded for participating in volatile markets, a 
trading rule similar to that developed by Collie, Sylvanus and Thomas (2011) is investigated in order 
to test the efficacy of moderating equity exposure depending on the prevailing volatility level. Collie, 
Sylvanus and Thomas (2011) found volatility to be persistent, thus recent weighted volatility is used 
to represent the prevailing level of volatility, such that new information weighs more heavily than old 
information. The reason for this approach is that Engle and Patton (2001) found that volatility is 
somewhat mean reverting and thus not random, so if each day was weighted equally, realized 
volatility would lag the true unobserved prevailing level of volatility. For example, should markets 
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be at the end of a crisis and calmer conditions prevail, standard volatility may still be elevated whereas 
weighted volatility which weights recent information more than old information would indicate lower 
levels of volatility more congruent with prevailing conditions. 
 
Mina and Xiao (2001) note that the optimal decay factor to estimate daily volatility is 0.94. In order 
to calculate the weighted standard deviation, equation 15 is used where wi is the weight given to the 
ith observation, N’ is equal to the total number of non-zero weights and ?̅?w is the weighted mean 
return. For example, the weight assigned to the return at time t is 1, the weight assigned to the return 
at time t-1 is 0.94, and the weight assigned to the return at time t-2 is 0.8836 (0.94 times 0.94) and so 
on.  
 
 
𝑆𝑤 = √
∑ 𝑤𝑖(𝑅𝑖 − ?̅?𝑤
𝑁
𝑖=1 )
2
(𝑁′ − 1) ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁′
 
(15) 
 
The time-frame chosen to capture daily weighted volatility is 42-trading days (akin to 2-calendar 
months). The reason that a longer period was preferred to a shorter period such as the 10-trading day 
period to determine the relationship between volatility and subsequent return is that it is reasonable 
to suspect that slightly older data may still provide some valuable information given substantial past 
research on the persistence of volatility. In some cases, older information may still have a bearing on 
recent information and thus a time-frame of 42-trading days attempts to capture some remnants of 
older information which may also assist in reducing the impact of potential noise in new data. Under 
this convention, figure 3 below illustrates how using a 0.94 decay factor will result in the most recent 
10-trading days being given a combined weight of 49.85%, with the most recent 21-trading days 
having a combined weight of 78.57%, leaving just a 21.43% weighting for the oldest 21-trading days.  
 
Figure 3: Illustrating how the decay factor weighs past information 
 
time t-21 trading daystime t-42 trading days time t
49.85%
time t-10 trading days
Cumulative Weight
78.57%100% 0%
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Figure 4 below illustrates how at the end of every trading day, the 42-trading day weighted volatility 
(st) is compared with the distribution of all available preceding history’s daily 42-trading day 
weighted volatility’s. In the example, assuming that time t has an st of 17%, where st is equal to the 
standard deviation at time t, this st is classified under the 4
th decile of the historical distribution, and 
it is according to the decile classification that equity exposure is assigned to capture next day equity 
returns.  
  
Figure 4: Classification of st relative to historical distribution  
 
After st has been assigned into a decile relative to the historical distribution, table 6 describes how 
the equity cash asset allocation decision was taken on a daily basis. The low volatility threshold is set 
at the 6th decile of historical volatility, with any 42-trading day weighted volatility (daily volatility) 
categorized as equal to or less than the level of volatility that corresponds to the 6th decile of historical 
volatility being assigned a 100% equity allocation and a 0% cash allocation.  
 
Table 6: Summary of daily equity allocation according to level of volatility 
Daily Weighted Volatility vs Historical Volatility Equity Cash Portfolio 
st ≤ 6th Decile 100% 0% 100% 
6th Decile < st ≤ 7th Decile 67% 33% 100% 
7th Decile < st ≤ 8th Decile 33% 67% 100% 
st > 8
th Decile 0% 100% 100% 
 
The high volatility threshold is set at the 8th decile such that when daily volatility was higher than the 
8th decile of historical volatility, a 0% equity allocation and 100% cash allocation was assigned. When 
daily volatility was between the 6th and 7th decile of historical volatility, a 67% allocation was given 
to equity and 33% allocation given to cash, and finally, when daily volatility was between the 7th and 
Minimum 
historical 
weighted volatility
42%st = 17%10%
Maximum 
historical 
weighted volatility
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8th decile of historical volatility, a 33% allocation was given to equity and a 67% allocation was given 
to cash. 
Defining daily equity-cash allocation by the prevailing level of volatility relative to its historical 
distribution as opposed to defining it according to how the prevailing level of volatility compares to 
some absolute level of volatility gives flexibility to the trading rule. As the same rule is tested across 
various markets, it is reasonable to suggest the long-run average volatility of developing markets is 
greater than developed markets, thus making the use of the same absolute level of volatility upon 
which daily volatility is compared to as had been done in past studies problematic.  
 
Additionally, it is reasonable and prudent to accept that not all types or severities of tail-events are 
represented in historical data, thus although the strategy is susceptible to tail-events of greater severity 
than what had been experienced in the past, it is preferred to the use of any rolling period which may 
have zero representation of tail-events at all.  
 
The use of all available historical data also allows the trading rule to be fluid in nature as the 6th decile 
which defines the low-volatility threshold can change dramatically with the inclusion of severe tail-
events such as the GFC. The drawback of this approach is that new information has a smaller and 
smaller impact on the time series as time goes on. That is, a shock towards the end of the series will 
have less impact on how asset allocation decisions are subsequently made than a shock towards the 
beginning of the series. 
 
The trading rule may present other challenges to investors with fixed strategic asset allocation targets. 
As the rule regulates exposure between equity and cash, the overall effective equity exposure 
investors may expect over time can be computed per equation 16 below. For example, if the trading 
rule suggested equity allocations of 67% and 33% over 2-trading days, the effective equity exposure 
would be 50%. 
 
 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 =
𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝑛
 
(16) 
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
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While derivatives are used in this dissertation to attain volatility exposure, each strategy investigated 
assumes that portfolios were 100% collateralized. This means that all possible losses could readily be 
paid out. In the case of ATM option-selling strategies, 100% collateralization creates an effective 
apples-to-apples comparison with equity as drawdown profiles are identical with the exception that 
the drawdowns of short ATM option-strategies still earn premium while experiencing drawdowns. 
By applying systematic, rules-based methodologies, the strategies used in this dissertation to capture 
volatility exposure will result in a better understanding of the risk and return characteristics of 
volatility exposure. The same rules-based approach is applied to the managed volatility trading rule 
in that the same formula is applied across markets that intend to cover the entire globe. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
                            FINDINGS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 4 discusses the findings of the trading rules developed to capture returns from volatility 
products as well as to reduce equity drawdown risk by using volatility as a signal to regulate equity 
exposure. Each strategy is summarized according to its cumulative return, risk (using annualized 
volatility, 95% and 99% daily Value-at-Risk and Conditional Value-at-Risk) as well as other 
summary statistics over the period and compared with an equity over a matching period. 
 
4.2 VOLATILITY RISK PREMIUM STRATEGIES 
 
4.2.1 Vanilla options strategies 
 
• The volatility risk premium 
 
Figure 5 below illustrates implied volatility as proxied by the VIX Index vs. ex-post realized volatility 
on the S&P 500 Index as well as the volatility risk premium (implied volatility minus realized 
volatility). Consistent with the findings of Israelov and Nielsen (2015), the results indicate that the 
volatility risk premium (VRP) was positive 88.94% of the trading days between 3 January 1990 and 
30 June 2016. Over this period, the average of the VIX Index was 19.79% compared with average 
realized volatility of 15.58% resulting in the average VRP of 4.21%. It is evident that option-buyers 
would have paid a considerable amount away over time for protection given so few instances when 
VRP was negative. Negative VRP episodes were caused by sharp and unexpected falls in the S&P 
500 Index, and not necessarily during equity bear markets. For example, during the US recessionary 
episode from Q3 2001 to Q4 2002, the VRP was positive 82.82% of the time. In terms of the 2008 
GFC, the period from Q3 2008 to Q4 2009 suggests that the VRP was positive 70.92% of the time 
with the average VRP over this period being 1.72%. This suggests a strong tendency for the VRP to 
rapidly adjust to major shocks as option-sellers rapidly demand higher premiums to provide insurance 
in highly volatile markets. 
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Figure 5: Volatility risk premium 
 
 
Figure 6 below exhibits the average VIX level per decile where decile 1 (10) contained the lowest 
(highest) historical VIX price levels. The mean VIX level in decile 1 was 11.47% compared with 
37.06% for decile 10. The VIX level was greater than 30% only 8.70% of the time indicating that 
generally, relatively low levels of volatility were anticipated by options markets over the period 
examined. 
 
Figure 6: Mean VIX Index level per VIX decile 
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Figure 7 illustrates the mean VRP per VIX decile across the period. It is evident that VRP was positive 
on average across each decile, consistent with the findings of Israelov and Nielsen (2015). The fact 
that VRP was not much different in decile 1 from the other deciles, despite the low VIX level resulting 
in low options prices in absolute terms, indicates that options were still expensive as long volatility 
exposure would have still had negative returns. Decile 10 generated the lowest VRP of 3.19% and 
the highest VRP of 5.29% was generated by decile 9. 
 
Figure 7: Mean volatility risk premium per VIX decile 
 
 
• CBOE S&P 500 PutWrite Index vs. short ATM S&P 500 Index options 
 
Figure 8 below compares the cumulative returns of a short ATM S&P 500 Index put option strategy 
(short ATM options strategy) to the CBOE S&P 500 PutWrite Index. Figure 9 illustrates the 
drawdowns over the period for both strategies. Both strategies involve the sale of ATM S&P 500 
Index put options, but the former writes second-month contracts at the end of every month, and the 
latter sells front month ATM S&P 500 Index options on each expiration date. The annualized HPR 
for the short ATM options strategy was 6.77% which was slightly higher than the 6.61% achieved by 
the PutWrite Index. Given that the short ATM options strategy writes options with slightly longer 
maturity than the PutWrite Index does, one would expect a slight outperformance over time 
accompanied by slightly higher risk. Table 7 confirms that this was indeed the case with the 
annualized volatility experienced by the short ATM options strategy being 15.07% which was slightly 
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greater than the 14.27% attained by the PutWrite Index. Ultimately, Sharpe ratios were similar with 
the short ATM options strategy achieving 0.40 compared with 0.41 obtained by the PutWrite Index. 
 
Figure 8: CBOE S&P 500 PutWrite Index vs short ATM S&P 500 Index options cumulative 
returns 
 
 
Figure 9: CBOE S&P 500 PutWrite Index vs short ATM S&P 500 Index options drawdowns 
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statistics across both strategies are also fairly similar. The 95% daily CVaR statistics were -2.44% 
and -2.36% for the short ATM options strategy and PutWrite Index respectively, and -4.55% and -
4.52% for the 99% daily CVaR statistic respectively. The maximum drawdown suffered by the short 
ATM options strategy was -33.87% and -37.09% for the PutWrite Index, and the minimum daily 
return -7.81% for the short ATM options strategy was also similar to the -9.37% suffered by the 
PutWrite Index. The worst 6-month HPR experienced by the option-selling strategy was -29.29% 
compared with -31.47% by the PutWrite Index, and the best 6-month HPR was 19.22% and 24.48% 
for the option-selling strategy and PutWrite Index respectively. 
 
In terms of the distributional properties of each approach, skewness was 0.01 for the short ATM 
options strategy and -0.18 for the PutWrite Index. Excess kurtosis for both strategies were high with 
the short ATM options strategy and PutWrite Index experiencing an excess kurtosis of 20.39 and 
27.13 respectively. Overall, the remarkable similarity of the two strategies as evidenced by a high 
correlation of daily returns and similar risk profile validates the methodology used to compute both 
the daily value of option premiums as well as the translation of those premiums into an index. 
 
• S&P 500 Index vs. CBOE S&P 500 PutWrite Index vs Short ATM S&P 500 Index options 
 
Figure 10 below illustrates the cumulative return of the S&P 500 Index, CBOE S&P 500 PutWrite 
Index and the short ATM S&P 500 Index put options strategy from the 21 November 2005 until 30 
June 2016. From an absolute return vantage point, the annualized return of 4.97% obtained by the 
S&P 500 Index was inferior to the annualized returns experienced by the PutWrite Index and the short 
ATM options strategy. Figure 11 illustrates that the VRP strategies also enjoyed considerably 
shallower drawdowns through the period which is evidenced by an annualized volatility of 20.46% 
experienced by the S&P 500 Index compared with 15.00% and 14.27% suffered by the short ATM 
options strategy and PutWrite Index respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
61 
 
Figure 10: S&P 500 Index vs. CBOE PutWrite Index vs. Short ATM S&P 500 Index options 
cumulative returns 
 
 
Figure 11: S&P 500 Index vs. CBOE PutWrite Index vs. Short ATM S&P 500 Index options 
drawdowns 
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suggested that options markets tend to rapidly price in mean-reversion. This, in turn, causes implied 
volatility to fall lower than realized volatility faster than equity tends to recover.  
 
It is important to note that the GFC largely impacted the period under review. Thus one cannot infer 
that option-selling strategies will always outperform equity on an absolute basis. It is evident that 
equity achieved stronger returns during the recovery phase following the GFC, which suggests that 
equity may outperform option-selling strategies during periods of low volatility, but option-selling 
strategies may have shallower drawdowns and quicker recoveries than equity during market crisis’.  
 
The Sharpe ratio of 0.21 obtained by the S&P 500 Index was less impressive than the 0.40 and 0.41 
Sharpe ratios achieved by the short ATM options strategy and PutWrite Index respectively. Regarding 
tail-risk measures, the 95% daily CVaR for the S&P 500 Index was -3.20% which was inferior to the 
–2.44% and -2.36% obtained by the short ATM options strategy and PutWrite Index respectively. 
Similarly, the 99% daily CVaR of -5.55% was more severe than the -4.55% and -4.52% experienced 
by the short ATM options strategy and PutWrite Index respectively. The best 6-month HPR was 
30.86% for the S&P 500 Index, which was greater than both the option-selling strategy and PutWrite 
Index which generated 19.22% and 24.48% respectively. The worst 6-month HPR experienced by 
the S&P 500 Index of -39.78% was however more severe than the -29.29% and -31.47% suffered by 
the option-selling strategy and PutWrite Index respectively. 
 
The daily returns of the S&P 500 Index had a similar negative skew as the PutWrite Index. The VRP 
strategies and the S&P 500 Index had positive excess kurtosis indicating that each had leptokurtic 
distributions characterized by fat tails and sharp peaks. The excess kurtosis for the short ATM options 
strategy was 20.39 and 27.13 for the PutWrite Index which were higher than the 10.58 experienced 
by the S&P 500 Index indicating that the distribution of the daily VRP strategy returns had relatively 
sharper peaks with relatively fatter tails than equity over the period. The maximum drawdown of the 
short ATM options strategy was -33.87% compared with -37.09% and -56.78% for the PutWrite 
Index and S&P 500 Index respectively. This finding was in line with the relative inferiority of the 
S&P 500 Index on tail-risk measures when compared with option-selling strategies. 
 
Table 8 indicates that the S&P 500 Index had a correlation of 0.95 with the short ATM options 
strategy and 0.90 with the PutWrite Index over the period. Thus, option-selling strategies may be an 
additional asset class worth considering given that it has offered imperfectly-correlated equity-like 
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returns, with a more attractive risk profile. Additionally, volatility as an asset class may be more 
robust than equity to the rising levels of interest that may come about as interest rates are normalized. 
This assertion cannot be reliably tested given that implied volatility data used to price put options on 
a daily basis was only available from 2005 and thus did not contain a long enough period during 
which the US Federal Reserve engaged in a program of increasing interest rates over a fairly long 
period. 
 
• S&P 500 Index vs. various VRP strategies 
 
Given that both the PutWrite Index as well as the short ATM options strategy were competitive on a 
risk-return basis with equity over the period, two additional short implied-volatility strategies will be 
investigated. First, a short 5% OTM S&P 500 Index options strategy (short 5% OTM options strategy) 
that should be of a lower risk profile than the strategies that are short ATM options given that losses 
are only suffered when the spot price is less than 5% below the strike price as opposed 0%. Second, 
a bull put spread options strategy which is short ATM S&P 500 Index options and long 10% OTM 
S&P 500 Index options (bull put spread strategy) with the same expiry dates. The purpose of the 
simultaneous long/short position is so that a floor is placed on the maximum loss that can be 
experienced if implied volatility rises sufficiently over realized volatility.  
 
Figure 12 below illustrates the cumulative return of the strategies from 21 November 2005 to 30 June 
2016, and figure 13 shows the drawdowns for all strategies over the same period. The 5% OTM 
options strategy appeared to enjoy the greatest performance of all approaches with an annualized 
HPR of 7.43% while the bull put spread strategy obtained the worst performance on an absolute basis 
of 2.37%. The short ATM options strategy obtained an annualized HPR of 6.77% which implied that 
the purchasing of 10% OTM options cost the bull put spread strategy 4.40% per annum. This finding 
is in line with the results of Israelov and Nielsen (2015) who found the purchase of put options to be 
restrictively expensive. This finding would also negate the feasibility of bull put spread strategies 
with long positions closer to the money given the higher drag on returns associated with options 
purchased closer to the money if investors were interested in absolute return targets. Therefore, the 
sale of naked near-the-money options (where the risk preference premium lies) appears to be the more 
efficient than the bull put spread strategy. 
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Figure 12: Cumulative return per option-selling strategy 
 
 
Figure 13: Drawdowns per option-selling strategy 
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Table 7: S&P 500 Index vs. CBOE S&P 500 PutWrite Index summary statistics 
 
Short ATM 
S&P Options 
Short 5% 
OTM S&P 
Options 
Short 5% 
OTM and 
Long 10% 
OTM S&P 
Options 
CBOE S&P 
500 
PutWrite 
Index 
S&P 500 
Index 
Annualized 
HPR 
6.77% 7.43% 2.37% 6.61% 4.97% 
Annualized 
Volatility 
15.07% 11.60% 4.08% 14.27% 20.46% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.40 0.57 0.40 0.41 0.21 
VaR (95%) -1.37% -0.69% -0.36% -1.25% -1.98% 
CVaR (95%) -2.44% -1.75% -0.68% -2.36% -3.20% 
VaR (99%) -3.17% -2.39% -0.89% -2.99% -3.94% 
CVaR (99%) -4.55% -4.08% -1.34% -4.52% -5.55% 
Maximum 
Drawdown 
-33.87% -26.91% -12.14% -37.09% -56.78% 
Skewness 0.01 0.65 -0.79 -0.18 -0.09 
Excess 
Kurtosis 
20.39 51.20 18.83 27.13 10.58 
Minimum 
Daily HPR 
-7.81% -7.63% -2.55% -9.37% -9.03% 
Maximum 
Daily HPR 
10.39% 10.32% 2.50% 11.58% 11.58% 
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Figure 14: Best and worst 6-month HPR per option-selling strategy 
 
 
Table 7 shows that the lower return obtained by the bull put spread strategy was accompanied by a 
relatively low annualized volatility of 4.08% compared with the 11.60% experienced by the short 5% 
OTM options strategy which was lower still than the 15.07% experienced by the ATM options 
strategy. The short 5% OTM options strategy enjoyed the highest Sharpe ratio of 0.57 followed 
closely by 0.41 attained by the PutWrite Index and 0.40 experienced by both the short ATM options 
strategy and bull put strategy respectively.   
 
All tail-risk measures indicated that the bull put spread strategy was considerably less risky than the 
other strategies with a 95% CVaR of -0.68% and 99% CVaR of -1.34% followed by the short 5% 
OTM options strategy which experienced -1.75% and -4.08% respectively. Table 7 shows that the 
maximum drawdown of -12.14% obtained by the bull put spread strategy was considerably less than 
the other strategies with equity experiencing the deepest maximum drawdown of -56.78%. The short 
5% OTM options strategy exhibited a positive skewness of 0.65 and the bull put spread strategy 
exhibited negative skewness of -0.79. The excess kurtosis of the short 5% OTM options strategy was 
51.20 over the period compared with a relatively lower positive excess kurtosis of 18.83 for the bull 
put spread strategy. 
 
The short 5% OTM options strategy appeared to have more favourable risk-return characteristics than 
the short ATM options strategy achieving slightly higher return as well as a more attractive risk 
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experiencing higher daily returns than the short 5% OTM strategy which one would expect during 
periods of relatively low volatility as the greater risk accepted by the short ATM option strategy is 
expected to be rewarded.     
 
Table 8 indicates that the daily returns of the short 5% OTM options strategy had a correlation of 0.78 
with the bull put strategy; 0.88 with the PutWrite Index; 0.86 with the S&P 500 Index and 0.95 with 
the short ATM options strategy. The bull put strategy had a correlation of 0.86 with the short ATM 
options strategy, 0.77 with the PutWrite Index and 0.83 with the S&P 500 Index.  
 
Table 8: Correlations between strategies over the full period 
  
Short ATM 
S&P Options 
Short 5% 
OTM S&P 
Options 
Short 5% 
OTM and 
Long 10% 
OTM S&P 
Options 
CBOE S&P 
500 PutWrite 
Index  
S&P 500 
Index 
Short ATM 
S&P Options 
1.00     
Short 5% 
OTM S&P 
Options 
0.95 1.00    
Short 5% 
OTM and 
Long 10% 
OTM S&P 
Options 
0.86 0.78 1.00   
CBOE S&P 
500 PutWrite 
Index  
0.93 0.88 0.77 1.00  
S&P 500 
Index 
0.95 0.86 0.83 0.90 1.00 
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In summary, our findings were consistent with those of Rennison and Pedersen (2012), in that the 
return characteristics of the VRP strategies aside from the bull put spread strategy appeared to be 
comparable to the S&P 500 Index on average across the period but were superior to equity during the 
GFC. The drawdowns experienced by all the VRP strategies were more favourable than the S&P 500 
Index, and all VRP strategies enjoyed a faster recovery post-GFC than the S&P 500 Index. Moreover, 
the tail-risk statistics experienced by the option-selling strategies were historically superior to those 
of the S&P 500 Index. All VRP strategies obtained higher Sharpe ratios than the S&P 500 Index 
which indicates that investors should consider the introduction of volatility as an asset class into their 
portfolios. Additionally, the option-selling strategies simulated in this dissertation were modelled in 
portfolios that were 100% collateralized. That is, the exposure attained through the sale of options 
was matched one-for-one with cash, such that cash was held for all possible losses. Thus, barring any 
constraints, investors could utilize leverage (by reducing collateralization) to increase expected 
returns. Thus, should investors seek higher returns over time from more conservative options 
strategies such as bull put spread strategies, the reduction of the level of collateralization could raise 
expected returns.  
 
4.2.2 VIX futures strategy 
 
• Findings for the full sample period 
 
An investigation into the performance of the S&P 500 Index and a VIX futures strategy inspired by 
Simon and Campasano (2014) was conducted from the 31st of March 2004 until the 30th of June 2016. 
Daily trade directions of VIX futures (long or short) were inferred from the state of the VIX futures 
curve as at market close the day before. If the VIX futures basis was in contango, a short position on 
VIX futures was taken at the beginning of the following day. If the VIX futures curve as in 
backwardation, a long position was taken. 
 
Positions were delta hedged on a monthly basis in an attempt to minimize the risk associated with 
adverse price movements in the underlying instrument. Tables 9 to 11 below disect the statistics used 
in this study. Table 9 describes the levels of the VIX Index, front-month VIX futures prices and basis, 
second-month VIX futures prices and basis as well as the E-mini S&P 500 futures prices. The VIX 
Index averaged 19.38% over the period with the VIX front-month and second-month futures 
averaging slightly higher at 19.88% and 20.65% respectively. The maximum of the VIX Index over 
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the period was 90.86% which was higher than the 67.95% and 59.77% for the VIX front-month and 
second-month futures respectively. Similar to the findings of Simon and Campasano (2014), the range 
exhibited by the VIX futures prices was smaller than the VIX Index which implies that the VIX 
futures were at lower prices to the VIX when the VIX was at relatively high levels and higher prices 
to the VIX when the VIX was at relatively lower levels. This finding appears to demonstrate that 
options markets price in a degree of mean-reversion in volatility levels. The average of the basis of 
the front-month and second-month futures was 0.50% and 1.28% respectively. This indicates that 
contango episodes were more prevalent than backwardation episodes as both front and second-month 
averages were positive. 
 
Table 9: Summary statistics of the VIX Index and VIX futures levels 
Levels VIX Index 
Front-
Month 
Second- 
Month 
Front-
Month 
Basis 
Second-
Month 
Basis 
E-mini 
S&P 500 
Mean 19.38% 19.88% 20.65% 0.50% 1.28% 1 422.34 
Maximum 80.86% 67.95% 59.77% 4.98% 7.13% 2128.00 
Minimum 9.89% 10.25% 11.72% -23.31% -35.57% 676.00 
Top Decile 29.52% 29.10% 30.17% 2.06% 3.93% 2018.75 
Bottom 
Decile 
12.06% 12.77% 13.85% -0.70% -1.23% 1072.8 
Skewness 2.53 2.21 1.81 -4.61 -4.41 0.58 
Excess 
Kurtosis 
8.47 6.11 4.10 38.71 32.38 -0.59 
 
Table 10 below describes the first-order differences in the VIX Index, first-month and second-month 
VIX futures as well as E-mini S&P 500 Index futures. It is evident that the volatility of VIX Index 
changes is greater than that of both the front-month and second-month futures with standard 
deviations of 29.06%, 20.43% and 14.57% respectively. This illustrates the the VIX futures curve 
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fluctuates considerably over time despite it being upward sloping on average. The volatility on the E-
mini S&P 500 futures was lower than that of the VIX Index and front-month VIX futures, while its 
largest positive and negative daily changes were similar to those of the VIX Index and futures. 
 
Table 10: Summary statistics of first-order differences in the VIX Index and VIX futures  
Levels VIX Index 
Front-
Month 
Second- 
Month 
Front-
Month 
Basis 
Second-
Month 
Basis 
E-mini 
S&P 500 
Mean 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.03% 
Standard 
Deviation 
29.06% 20.43% 14.57% 17.24% 20.21% 19.65% 
Maximum 16.74% 19.75% 19.85% 8.89% 15.37% 14.11% 
Minimum -17.36% -10.94% -7.30% -21.01% -20.63% -9.88% 
Top Decile 1.60% 1.20% 0.90% 0.81% 1.01% 1.17% 
Bottom 
Decile 
-1.53% -1.05% -0.82% -0.78% -0.96% -1.24% 
Skewness 0.89 1.64 
                    
3.69 
-2.51 -1.05 0.16 
Excess 
Kurtosis 
19.46 25.67 75.79 60.06 43.99 15.48 
 
Table 11 below provides more information on the periods of contango and backwardation per VIX 
Index level. At the lower end of the spectrum, it is evident that 67.91% of all historical VIX Index 
levels were below 20% and 22.53% of all VIX levels were between 20% and 30%. At the higher end 
of the spectrum, 5.06% of all observations were between 30% and 40%, 2.69% were between 40% 
and 50%, and only 1.81% were greater than 50%. 
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Table 11: Summary statistics periods of contango and backwardation per VIX Index level  
Front Month Obs 
VIX 
Average 
Basis of 
VIX 
Obs & % of time in 
Contango 
Obs & % of time in 
Backwardation 
All 
Observations 
3 085 19.38% 0.50% 2 330 75.53% 746 24.18% 
VIX<=20 2 095 14.71% 0.82% 1 739 83.01% 351 16.75% 
20<VIX<=30 695 23.83% 0.53% 468 67.34% 223 32.09% 
30<VIX<=40 156 33.92% -0.77% 78 50% 78 50% 
40<VIX<=50 83 44.21% -1.08% 41 49.40% 42 50.60% 
VIX>50 56 61.45% -6.05% 4 7.14% 52 92.86% 
 
Table 11 also indicates that the front-month VIX futures curve was in contango 75.53% and in 
backwardation for 24.18% of the days in the sample period. Periods of contango were generally 
associated with periods of low volatility as the front-month VIX futures curve was in contango 
83.01% of the time when the VIX was less than 20% and 67.34% of the time when the VIX was 
between 20% and 30%. Periods of backwardation were generally associated with periods of high 
volatility as the front-month VIX futures curve was in backwardation 92.86% of the time when the 
VIX was greater than 50%.  
Figure 15 illustrates this finding by shading the areas beneath the levels of the VIX Index and front-
month VIX futures prices during episodes of backwardation. The relatively high degree of volatility 
in VIX futures basis is evident in figure 15 given that periods of backwardation were relatively 
dispersed over the sample period. A cluster of backwardation episodes occurred during the 2008 GFC, 
during which investors began pricing in futures prices that were less than spot prices in an expectation 
for future VIX levels to fall back to historical norms. 
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Figure 15: Periods of contango and backwardation per VIX Index level  
 
 
Figure 16 below illustrates the cumulative return of the S&P 500 Index (equity) vs. the Combined 
VIX Strategy over the period, with figure 17 showing the drawdowns of both strategies over the 
period. It is evident that until the GFC, the combined VIX strategy outperformed equity. Given that 
the market was relatively calm for the vast majority of the time before the GFC evidenced by steadily 
rising equity levels, VIX futures curves were generally in contango.  
 
Figure 16: S&P 500 Index vs. combined VIX futures strategy cumulative returns 
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Figure 17: S&P 500 Index vs. combined VIX futures strategy drawdowns 
 
 
Table 12: S&P 500 Index vs. combined VIX futures strategy summary statistics 
  Combined VIX Strategy S&P 500 Index 
Annualized HPR 19.82% 7.42% 
Annualized Volatility 18.15% 19.44% 
Sharpe Ratio 1.04 0.34 
VaR (95%) -1.65% -1.81% 
CVaR (95%) -2.80% -3.00% 
VaR (99%) -3.56% -3.66% 
CVaR (99%) -4.83% -5.28% 
Maximum Drawdown -23.34% -55.25% 
Skewness -0.05 -0.09 
Excess Kurtosis 9.00 11.47 
Maximum Daily HPR 7.72% 11.58% 
Minimum Daily HPR -8.24% -9.03% 
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The strategy truly set itself apart from equity during the GFC where the state of VIX futures curves 
changed into backwardation thus triggering long positions in both VIX futures and equity futures. 
During the GFC, while a long VIX futures strategy without delta hedging experienced a sharp and 
substantial rise, the combined strategy experienced a somewhat less sharp but still impressive gain. 
This makes sense as E-mini S&P 500 futures contracts were purchased during a period of rapidly 
falling prices due to monthly delta-hedging.  
 
The gains experienced when the VIX futures basis was in contango mirrored the gains on short VRP 
strategies examined in the previous section as they were small in nature but frequently occurred with 
reasonably small drawdowns. The large gains experienced by the strategy which may explain a great 
deal of its outperformance were experienced during times when the VIX futures curve was in 
backwardation. While many of the largest single day losses were also experienced when the VIX 
curve was in backwardation, the win/loss ratio (the number of profitable trades divided by the total 
trades made) for these trades was higher than trades conducted when the VIX futures curve was in 
contango.   
 
Over the entire period, the VIX curve switched states 287 times implying that trading would have 
occurred approximately once every 10-trading days (analogous to a 2-week period). According to 
table 12, the cumulative return of the combined VIX strategy was an impressive 19.82% over the 
period under consideration compared with just 7.42% achieved by the S&P 500 Index. This finding 
is similar to that of Simon and Campasano (2014), and it is clearly evident that the success of the 
trading strategy over the period resulted from opportunely timing switching between long and short 
positions, particularly during the GFC. The maximum 6-month HPR for the VIX futures strategy was 
56.65% compared with 31.00% for the S&P 500 Index. The lowest 6-month HPR for the VIX futures 
strategy was -9.06% compared with -39.78% for the S&P 500 Index. 
 
In terms of risk measures, the volatility experienced by the combined VIX strategy was only 11.86% 
compared to 19.44% experienced by equity, resulting in a considerably superior Sharpe ratio in favour 
of the combined VIX strategy. Tail-risk measures also confirmed the efficiency of the combined VIX 
strategy with a daily 95% VaR and daily 95% CVaR of -0.94% and -1.62% respectively compared 
with -1.81% and -3.00% for equity respectively.  
 
75 
 
Skewness for the strategy was -0.05 compared with -0.09, and both the strategy and equity 
experienced positive excess kurtosis of 9.00 and 11.47 respectively. The highest single day return for 
the strategy was 7.72% vs 11.58% for equity and the sharpest single-day drop for the strategy was -
8.24% compared with a similar -9.03% for equity. 
 
It is important to note that the strategy began experiencing a steady drawdown from the end of 2012 
until almost the end of the period under investigation. Similar drawdowns were experienced by the 
options selling strategies examined in the previous section. Equity appeared to have achieved 
formidable returns over this period, and while the overall strategy seems to mirror past findings fairly 
well, it is worthwhile isolating for the period after the GFC seeing as the GFC itself contributed so 
dramatically to the trendline of the strategy. 
 
• Findings for the sub-sample period from 2009 to 2016 
 
Figure 18 below describes the cumulative return of the strategy as well as equity from 2 January 2009 
to 30 June 2016. The S&P 500 Index experienced a sharp initial drawdown in the first quarter of 
2009, but generated strong returns up to the end of the period. While the strategy kept pace with 
equity for the first few years, it appeared to underperform equity from the end of 2012. From the 
fourth quarter of 2012 to the second quarter of 2016, the strategy suffered a lengthy drawdown best 
illustrated in figure 19.  
 
Figure 18: S&P 500 Index vs. combined VIX futures strategy post-GFC cumulative returns 
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Figure 19: S&P 500 Index vs. combined VIX futures strategy post-GFC drawdowns 
 
 
VIX levels across this drawdown period appeared to be low relative to historical levels, and the VIX 
futures curve was in contango over 85.01% of the time. Over the full sample period, the VIX futures 
curve was in contango an average of 75.53% of the time, thus the relatively low levels of volatility 
contributed to more periods of contango after the fourth quarter of 2012. The win/loss ratio when the 
VIX curve was in contango, i.e. the number of days in which profit was earned compared with the 
number of days in which losses were suffered was 41.09% for the period after the fourth quarter of 
2012. This culminated in underperformance greater than what was experienced during the GFC while 
equity was experiencing a recovery.  
 
Table 13 asserts that the annualized HPR for the strategy for the period following the GFC was 7.34% 
compared with 13.88% for equity. The strategy still maintained approximately the same volatility 
during this period as it had across the entire period resulting in a slightly smaller Sharpe ratio of 0.64 
compared with 0.69 achieved by equity. The maximum 6-month HPR for the VIX futures strategy 
was 19.76% compared with 31.00% for the S&P 500 Index. The lowest 6-month HPR for the VIX 
futures strategy was -9.06% compared with -17.71% for the S&P 500 Index. 
 
Skewness for the strategy was 0.21 compared with -0.17 for equity which differed from the statistics 
drawn from the full sample period. Both the strategy and equity experienced positive excess kurtosis 
of similar magnitude (5.23 and 4.35 respectively). The highest single day return for the strategy was 
4.47% vs 7.10% for equity and the sharpest single-day drop for the strategy was -4.31% compared 
with a similar -6.65% for equity. 
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While the strategy experienced a prolonged drawdown episode which reached its lowest point at -
23.34%, it only had one other drawdown greater than 10% across the period. Equity, on the other 
hand, experienced 6 separate sharp drawdown episodes of 10% or more, with the deepest drawdown 
being -27.19% resulting in mixed results in terms of tail-risk measures. While equity had less 
attractive VaR’s, the strategy had less attractive CVaR’s at both a 5% and 1% level of significance.  
 
Table 13: S&P 500 Index vs. combined VIX futures strategy post-GFC summary statistics 
  Combined VIX Strategy S&P 500 Index 
Annualized HPR 7.34% 13.88% 
Annualized Volatility 11.33% 17.83% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.64 0.69 
VAR (95%) -1.25% -2.32% 
CVaR (95%) -3.38% -1.96% 
VAR (99%) -2.62% -4.66% 
CVaR (99%) -5.49% -3.22% 
Maximum Drawdown -23.34% -27.19% 
Skewness 0.21 -0.17 
Excess Kurtosis 5.23 4.35 
Minimum Daily HPR -4.31% -6.65% 
Maximum Daily HPR 4.47% 7.10% 
 
In conclusion, while the combined VIX strategy appeared to support past findings of impressive 
outperformance since inception, it experienced far less impressive returns after the 2008 GFC crisis. 
A severe and prolonged drawdown since the end of 2012 contributed most significantly to the overall 
underperformance after the crisis, despite relatively similar conditions being experienced as those 
before the 2008 GFC. It could be argued that the underperformance of the strategy raises questions 
regarding the persistence of the strategy in the long-run. The strategy did however generate a strong 
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performance during the 2008 GFC, suggesting that the strategy may warrant implementation only 
when the VIX futures curve is in backwardation.   
 
4.2.3 30/30/40 volatility/equity/bond portfolios vs the 60/40 equity/bond portfolio 
 
• Findings for the full sample period 
 
Now that the performance of several option-selling strategies, a bull put spread strategy as well as a 
VIX futures strategy has been reviewed, an investigation into how each would have contributed to 
the performance of a traditional portfolio over time is conducted. Each option-selling strategy as well 
as the VIX futures strategy was combined in a 30/30/40 volatility/equity/bond portfolio and compared 
with a traditional 60/40 equity/bond portfolio from 21 November 2005 to 30 June 2016. For example, 
the Short ATM S&P Option Blend was made up of 30% short ATM S&P 500 Index options strategy, 
30% S&P 500 Index and 40% iShares 20+ Year Treasury-bond ETF (TLT). Each portfolio was 
rebalanced at the end of each calendar month, and figure 20 below illustrates the annualized HPR per 
portfolio. It is evident that the bull put spread strategy blend generated the least return on an absolute 
basis, with all other volatility blended portfolios outperforming the traditional 60/40 portfolio on an 
absolute basis. The VIX futures strategy blend generated the highest annualized HPR of 9.97% 
followed by the short 5% OTM S&P option strategy blend.  
 
Figure 20: Annualized HPR per 30/30/40 volatility/equity/bond Portfolio 
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In terms of risk-adjusted performance, figure 21 below highlights the Sharpe ratios generated per 
portfolio and both the traditional 60/40 and the bull put spread strategy blend experienced the lowest 
Sharpe ratio of 0.42. The VIX futures strategy blend generated the highest Sharpe ratio of 1.21 
followed by the 0.64 experienced by the short 5% OTM S&P option strategy blend. 
  
Figure 21: Sharpe ratio per 30/30/40 volatility/equity/bond portfolio 
 
Figure 22: Best and worst 6-month HPR per 30/30/40 volatility/equity/bond portfolio 
 
Figure 22 illustrates the best and worst 6-month HPR per portfolio, and it is again evident that the 
VIX futures strategy blend generated the most attractive risk-return profile given that it had both the 
highest positive 6-month HPR and the least severe negative 6-month HPR. The traditional 60/40 
0.54 
0.64 
0.42 0.42 
0.58 
1.21 
 -
 0.20
 0.40
 0.60
 0.80
 1.00
 1.20
 1.40
Short ATM S&P
Option Blend
Short 5% OTM S&P
Option Blend
Short ATM and Long
10% OTM S&P
Option Blend
S&P 500 Index
Blend
CBOE PutWrite
Index Blend
VIX Futures Strategy
Blend
S
h
a
rp
e 
R
a
ti
o
Strategy
-16.56%
-15.42%
-11.97%
-18.79%
-12.87%
-8.38%
11.97%
12.15%
10.50%
13.51%
12.15%
30.00%
-20.00% -10.00% 0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 30.00%
Short ATM S&P Option Blend
Short 5% OTM S&P Option Blend
Short ATM and Long 10% OTM S&P Option Blend
S&P 500 Index Blend
CBOE PutWrite Index Blend
VIX Futures Strategy Blend
6-Month HPR
S
tr
a
te
g
y
Worst 6-Month HPR Best 6-Month HPR
80 
 
suffered the most severe negative 6-month HPR of -18.79% followed by the short ATM S&P options 
strategy blend with -16.56%.  
Table 14 describes the summary statistics per strategy and it is evident that the introduction of 
volatility as an asset class in all forms investigated by this dissertation improved the tail-risk profile 
of the traditional 60/40 portfolio. The 60/40 portfolio suffered the most severe 95% and 99% CVaR’s, 
as well as the deepest drawdown of -31.33%. 
 
Table 14: Summary statistics per 30/30/40 volatility/equity/bond portfolio 
  
 Short 
ATM S&P 
Option 
Blend  
 Short 5% 
OTM S&P 
Option 
Blend  
Bull Put 
Spread 
Blend  
 S&P 500 
Index 
Blend  
 CBOE 
PutWrite 
Index 
Blend  
 VIX 
Futures 
Strategy 
Blend  
Annualized 
HPR 
5.25% 5.52% 3.82% 4.64% 5.01% 9.97% 
Annualized 
Volatility 
7.59% 6.84% 6.39% 8.37% 6.71% 7.25% 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
0.54 0.64 0.42 0.42 0.58 1.21 
VAR (95%) -0.69% -0.58% -0.65% -0.81% -0.66% -0.58% 
CVaR 
(95%) 
-1.19% -1.04% -1.00% -1.31% -1.04% -1.05% 
VAR (99%) -1.42% -1.31% -1.22% -1.52% -1.24% -1.39% 
CVaR 
(99%) 
-2.08% -1.96% -1.63% -2.21% -1.76% -1.87% 
Maximum 
Drawdown 
-24.12% -20.17% -22.72% -31.33% -19.35% -12.76% 
Skewness -0.03 0.11 -0.11 -0.05 -0.18 1.48 
Excess 
Kurtosis 
15.84 23.62 6.58 11.50 11.40 27.01 
Minimum 
Daily HPR 
-4.33% -4.38% -2.58% -4.38% -3.82% -4.34% 
Maximum 
Daily HPR 
5.28% 5.39% 3.06% 5.19% 4.37% 5.55% 
 
In terms of annualized volatility, the traditional 60/40 portfolio exhibited the highest volatility of 
8.37%. The lowest annualized volatility of 6.39% was experienced by the bull put spread strategy 
blend, followed closely by the PutWrite Index blend and the short 5% OTM options strategy blend 
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with figures of 6.71% and 6.84% respectively. Unsurprisingly, the maximum drawdown suffered by 
the traditional 60/40 portfolio of -31.33% was most severe out of all back tested strategies, with the 
least severe maximum drawdown of -12.76% being experienced by the VIX futures strategy blend. 
 
• Findings for the sub-sample period 2009 to 2016 
 
The comparison between volatility blended portfolios and the traditional 60/40 portfolio was 
conducted for the period 2 January 2009 to 30 June 2016. This period was chosen  to investigate 
whether the introduction of volatility into traditional 60/40 portfolios still resulted in risk-return 
improvements.  
 
Figure 23 below describes the annualized HPR per portfolio. The 60/40 portfolio generated the 
highest annualized HPR of 8.63% over the period, followed by the PutWrite Index blend which 
generated 8.13%. This is somewhat unsuprising given our previous findings of strong equity 
performance following the 2008 GFC. As with the full sample period, the lowest annualized HPR 
was generated by the bull put spread strategy blend. The VIX futures strategy blend returned 
considerably less in the period following 2009 indicating again that the market anomaly that may 
have existed up to the end of the GFC has subsequently been traded away.  
 
Figure 23: Annualized HPR per 30/30/40 volatility/equity/bond portfolio 
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Figure 24: Sharpe ratio per 30/30/40 volatility/equity/bond portfolio 
 
Regarding risk-adjusted performance, figure 24 above illustrates the Sharpe ratios generated per 
portfolio and both the traditional 60/40. The highest Sharpe ratio of 1.22 was generated by the short 
5% OTM S&P option strategy blend, followed by 1.14 achieved by the PutWrite Index blend. The 
60/40 portfolio achieved the third highest Sharpe ratio, ahead of the bull put strategy blend and the 
VIX futures strategy blend. Figure 25 below suggests that the traditional 60/40 portfolio exhibited 
substantially better performance in the period following the 2008 GFC than it did across the entire 
period. Despite this strong performance, it is evident from figure 25 that the option-selling strategies 
still managed to deliver competitive results when weighing best and worst 6-month HPRs. 
 
Figure 25: Best and worst 6-month HPR per 30/30/40 volatility/equity/bond portfolio 
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Table 15 below indicates that the tail-risk improvements attained with the 30/30/40 
volatility/equity/bond portfolios still hold. Specifically, the daily 95% CVaR for the 60/40 portfolio 
was greater than each of the individual volatility blended portfolios, with the same being true of the 
daily 99% CVaR. Additionally, the most severe maximum drawdown was also suffered by the 
traditional 60/40 portfolio.   
 
Table 15: Summary Statistics per 30/30/40 volatility/equity/bond portfolio 
  
 Short 
ATM S&P 
Option 
Blend  
 Short 5% 
OTM S&P 
Option 
Blend  
Bull Put 
Spread 
Blend  
 S&P 500 
Index 
Blend  
 CBOE 
PutWrite 
Index 
Blend  
 VIX 
Futures 
Strategy 
Blend  
Annualized 
HPR 
7.76% 7.63% 5.59% 8.63% 8.13% 6.03% 
Annualized 
Volatility 
7.34% 6.18% 6.31% 8.97% 7.05% 6.54% 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
1.04 1.22 0.87 0.95 1.14 0.91 
VAR (95%) -0.72% -0.57% -0.66% -0.92% -0.66% -0.63% 
CVaR 
(95%) 
-1.17% -0.97% -1.00% -1.41% -1.14% -1.00% 
VAR (99%) -1.45% -1.23% -1.26% -1.71% -1.38% -1.26% 
CVaR 
(99%) 
-1.88% -1.67% -1.52% -2.15% -1.86% -1.63% 
Maximum 
Drawdown 
-17.60% -15.97% -16.63% -21.03% -16.30% -11.23% 
Skewness -0.31 -0.32 -0.20 -0.15 -0.33 -0.15 
Excess 
Kurtosis 
7.15 10.47 4.84 5.46 8.67 9.15 
Minimum 
Daily HPR 
-3.37% -3.31% -2.43% -3.71% -3.69% -3.94% 
Maximum 
Daily HPR 
3.06% 3.03% 2.23% 3.85% 3.31% 2.73% 
 
In summary, while the 60/40 portfolio generated the highest annualized HPR from 2009 to 2016, the 
option-selling strategies generated competitive annualized HPRs, with higher Sharpe ratios than the 
traditional mix. Both across the full sample period and sub-sample period, all volatility blended 
portfolios improved the tail-risk profile of the traditional 60/40 portfolio.  
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4.3 MANAGED VOLATILITY TRADING RULE 
 
4.3.1 The relationship between volatility levels and subsequent returns 
 
• S&P 500 Index 
 
In order to determine whether a managed volatility trading rule that regulates equity exposure 
depending on the level of the prevailing rate of volatility is feasible, the relationship between the 
prevailing level of volatility and the returns experienced in subsequent periods is firstly determined. 
If higher volatility levels went inadequately rewarded as was found by past research, an investigation 
into reducing equity exposure during periods of elevated volatility and increasing equity exposure 
during periods where volatility was below certain thresholds could be investigated.  
 
Figure 26 illustrates the result of 1,140 10-trading day periods, sorted into deciles according to 
annualized volatility levels and with subsequent 10-trading day average returns plotted. In order to 
assign the same number of 10-trading day periods per decile, S&P 500 Index data from 3 January 
1972 to 9 March 2016 was used such that each decile had an even 114 10-trading day periods. Decile 
1 contained 114 10-trading day returns subsequent to the 114 least volatile 10-trading day periods, 
and decile 10 contained 114 10-trading day returns subsequent to the 114 most volatile 10-trading 
day periods. Table 16 describes the summary statistics per decile over the period. 
 
Figure 26: Average S&P 500 Index HPR per volatility decile 
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Table 16 shows that the average HPR across all deciles was 0.31% with deciles 4 to 9 experiencing 
similar or higher average HPRs than average with figures of 0.35%, 0.29%, 0.54%, 0.56%, 0.46% 
and 0.50% respectively. Deciles 1 to 3 experienced average HPRs that were below the mean with 
figures of 0.15%, 0.07% and 0.09% respectively, decile 10 whose returns were preceded by the 
highest levels of volatility experienced an average HPR of 0.08% which was also below the mean. 
 
The excess kurtosis across deciles varied somewhat with deciles 2 and 3 experiencing excess kurtosis 
of 0.08 and -0.03 respectively, similar to that of a normal distribution. All deciles apart from decile 7 
and 8 had positive excess kurtosis consistent with the fatter tails and sharper peaks associated with 
equity returns. All deciles apart from deciles 7 and 8 exhibited negative skewness that are also typical 
of equity returns. 
 
Deciles 9 and 10 had greater return dispersions than the other deciles with ranges (maximum HPR 
minus minimum HPR) of 27.90% and 27.57% respectively compared to only 8.75% for decile 1 for 
example. This finding suggests that historically, volatility has been mean-reverting. There was also 
evidence of outliers across most deciles given large differences between 5th and 95th percentiles and 
minimum and maximum values. The t-test described in equation 11 which compared the mean of 
each deciles average HPR to the mean HPR of the entire dataset was computed and showed that no 
decile had a statistically significant different mean HPR than the overall mean HPR at a 5% level of 
significance.  
 
Table 16: S&P 500 Index summary statistics per volatility decile 
Decile: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Mean HPR 0.15% 0.07% 0.09% 0.35% 0.29% 0.54% 0.56% 0.46% 0.50% 0.08% 
Kurtosis 0.80 0.08 -0.03 1.79 0.53 0.37 4.07 0.40 3.70 1.21 
Skewness -0.57 -0.37 -0.07 -0.32 -0.57 -0.32 0.62 0.12 -1.26 -0.64 
Max HPR 4.09% 5.29% 7.34% 9.63% 5.63% 7.53% 15.75% 11.39% 9.69% 11.75% 
Min HPR -4.66% -6.67% -5.13% -8.73% -8.03% -7.98% -8.37% -7.01% -17.88% -16.16% 
P-Value 0.29 0.27 0.33 0.87 0.93 0.36 0.41 0.64 0.59 0.61 
 
• MSCI EAFE Index 
 
The same tests were conducted on the MSCI EAFE Index, and Figure 27 illustrates the results of 
1,160 10-trading day periods from 3 January 1972 to 20 June 2016. The summary statistics described 
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in table 17 showed that only decile 3 experienced a negative mean HPR of -0.18% with mean HPRs 
fairly similar to the overall mean HPR of 0.29%. Other than decile 3, deciles 1,2,7,8 and 10 all 
underperformed the mean HPRs with results of 0.15%, 0.16%, 0.24%, 0.25% and 0.22%. The decile 
with the highest HPR was decile 5 followed closely by decile 9 with results of 0.58% and 0.56% 
respectively.  
 
Figure 27: Average MSCI EAFE Index HPR per volatility decile 
 
 
Excess kurtosis was positive across all deciles and was generally high meaning that distributions were 
generally leptokurtic characterized by tall peaks and fat tails. Most deciles exhibited negative 
skewness except for deciles 4, 5 and 7. Deciles 6, 9 and 10 had large ranges with fairly large 
differences between minimum and maximum values and 5th and 95th percentiles respectively.  
 
Similar to S&P 500 Index, table 17 below shows that lower deciles experienced average returns with 
a high degree of concentration around the mean with relatively small ranges. Also consistent with the 
S&P 500 Index, decile 10 was found to exhibit the highest level of return dispersion, most severe 
negative returns as well as an average HPR that underperformed the mean. 
 
The t-test’s again revealed that no decile had an average return that was significantly different from 
the mean of the entire dataset at a 5% level of significance. This finding is consistent with that of the 
S&P 500 Index.  
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Table 17: MSCI EAFE Index summary statistics per volatility decile 
Decile: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Mean HPR 0.15% 0.16% -0.18% 0.49% 0.58% 0.40% 0.24% 0.25% 0.56% 0.22% 
Kurtosis 0.53 1.61 3.09 0.29 0.55 4.25 0.13 0.26 1.40 2.85 
Skewness -0.62 -0.52 -0.29 0.13 0.15 -0.61 0.19 -0.36 -0.54 -0.04 
Max HPR 4.20% 5.63% 11.55% 9.20% 11.33% 9.88% 10.96% 8.23% 11.10% 19.18% 
Min HPR -7.11% -6.99% -8.63% -7.17% -6.31% -15.29% -7.66% -11.10% -14.29% -16.66% 
P-Value 0.46 0.51 0.08 0.46 0.30 0.73 0.88 0.91 0.46 0.88 
 
• MSCI EM Index 
In terms of emerging markets, figure 28 illustrates the result of 740 10-trading day periods on the 
MSCI EM Index from 1 January 1988 to 12 May 2016. A high degree of dispersion in returns was 
evident with decile 10 having a range of 43.81% compared to just 14.52% for decile 1. All other 
deciles exhibited relatively low degrees of dispersion in returns with the lower deciles again 
experiencing the smallest ranges consistent with the findings of developed markets. 
 
Figure 28: Average MSCI EM Index HPR per volatility decile 
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The excess kurtosis found in all deciles were relatively higher than those of the developed markets. 
Decile 10 had the highest kurtosis of 2.15 followed by decile 3 with 2.02. Deciles 6 and 9 displayed 
negative excess kurtosis of 0.22 and 0.29 respectively.  
 
Table 18: MSCI EM Index summary statistics per volatility decile 
Decile: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Mean HPR 0.37% 0.82% 0.32% 0.46% 0.16% 0.60% 0.52% -0.21% -0.21% 0.92% 
Kurtosis 1.20 0.25 2.02 1.96 1.55 -0.22 1.57 0.68 -0.26 2.15 
Skewness -0.43 -0.49 -0.89 -0.78 -0.57 -0.09 -0.55 -0.62 -0.22 -0.82 
Max HPR 5.95% 7.39% 8.11% 8.06% 7.58% 9.83% 11.75% 8.42% 8.56% 17.64% 
Min HPR -8.57% -7.84% -14.00% -13.57% -13.33% -7.74% -15.01% -15.71% -12.24% -26.17% 
P-Value 0.98 0.23 0.90 0.85 0.61 0.61 0.79 0.28 0.25 0.53 
 
• MSCI FM Index 
 
Figure 29 illustrates the result of 640 10-trading day periods from 3 June 2002 to 18 March 2016 on 
the MSCI FM Index. It is important to note that the data for frontier markets began in 2002 compared 
to 1988 for the MSCI EAFE Index and the MSCI EM Index and 1972 for the S&P 500 Index and 
therefore has a smaller sample size. 
 
Figure 29: Average MSCI FM Index HPR per volatility decile  
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Decile 2 achieved the highest average HPR of 1.07% for the period followed by decile 9 with 1.00%. 
The lowest return was experienced by decile 10 of -1.29% followed by decile -0.31% experienced by 
decile 8. Decile 10 again experienced the highest the highest range as well as the lowest negative 
return of -14.70%. The highest single period return was 12.58% experienced by decile 9. 
 
Table 19 shows that negative excess kurtosis was found in deciles 2 and 6 of -0.19 and -0.24 
respectively indicating that their distributions was slightly mesokurtic with relatively thinner tails and 
flatter peaks than a normal distribution of returns. Excess kurtosis was relatively high compared to 
the others in decile 3 of 6.97 which was followed by decile by a much lower 1.81 in decile 1. 
 
Negative skewness that is normally associated with equity returns of -0.24, -2.32, -0.77, -0.83, -0.42, 
-0.66 and -0.53 was found in deciles 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 10 respectively. Positive skewness of 0.01, 
0.45 and 0.27 was found in deciles 2, 8 and 9. In terms of the t-test to determine if the average return 
of any decile was significantly different from the overall mean, decile 2 was found to be statistically 
significantly different at a 5% level of significance. 
 
Table 19: MSCI FM Index summary statistics per volatility decile 
Decile: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Mean HPR 0.41% 1.07% 0.26% 0.30% -0.01% 0.40% 0.29% -0.31% 1.00% -1.29% 
Kurtosis 1.81 -0.19 6.97 2.22 1.64 -0.24 0.79 0.64 0.67 0.70 
Skewness -0.24 0.01 -2.32 -0.77 -0.83 -0.42 -0.66 0.45 0.27 -0.53 
Max HPR 6.13% 6.32% 3.15% 4.67% 5.07% 5.24% 7.28% 8.40% 12.58% 9.80% 
Min HPR -4.74% -3.58% -8.69% -5.89% -7.95% -6.70% -8.99% -5.41% -7.12% -14.70% 
P-Value 0.57 0.03 0.91 0.81 0.57 0.68 0.90 0.28 0.26 0.08 
 
To sum up, lower deciles across all markets generally displayed the lowest levels of return dispersion 
and decile 10 across all markets generally displayed the highest level of return dispersion with an 
average HPR that was below the overall mean except in the MSCI EM Index. Higher average HPRs 
were found in developing markets as one would expect, and these were also generally accompanied 
by larger return ranges.  
 
Individual decile average HPRs across all investigated markets differed to overall average HPRs 
except for decile 2 in the MSCI FM Index which was significantly different from the overall mean 
HPR at a 5% level of significance. However, this exception was in a decile with a relatively low 
volatility which displayed a HPR which outperformed the average overall HPR, indicating that our 
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findings were congruent with those of Collie, Sylvanus and Thomas (2011) in that insufficient 
evidence exists to suggest that investors were efficiently rewarded for participating in markets 
following periods of relatively high volatility. This assertion was made by the authors on the S&P 
500 Index, but our findings conclude that a similar phenomenon may exist in other developed as well 
as developing markets. The implication of this finding is that if investors are not sufficiently 
compensated for accepting risk particularly when volatility levels are elevated, then it may be 
inefficient to hold full equity exposures during these periods.  
 
4.3.2 Managed volatility trading rule 
 
The below section illustrates the performance of a trading rule that is based on the finding that high 
volatility is not necessarily adequately compensated for regulating equity exposure with a risk-free 
asset. Each day, the 42-trading day weighted volatility of each market was compared with the 
distribution of each market’s long-run weighted volatility and exposures were allocated depending 
on which decile it was classified under. Equity was given a 100% allocation if the 42-day weighted 
volatility was below the 6th decile of historical weighted volatility, 67% allocation if it was between 
the 6th and 7th decile, 33% allocation if it was between the 7th and 8th decile and a 0% allocation if it 
is in a decile greater than the 8th.  As each market index used in this section is based on US Dollar 
returns, the 3-month US T-Bill was used as a proxy for the risk-free asset that was given the balancing 
allocation on a daily basis. 
 
• S&P 500 Index 
 
The trading rule was first tested on the S&P 500 Index and proved impressive from a risk-return 
vantage point. According to table 20, the annualized HPR on the S&P 500 Index over the period was 
7.03% compared to 5.91% for the trading rule with figure 30 illustrating how both strategies fared 
over time. The annualized volatility experienced on the S&P 500 Index of 17.12% was considerably 
higher than the 5.91% attained by the trading rule. However Sharpe ratios were comparable given the 
S&P 500 Index’s relative outperformance on an absolute basis. When a paired t-test determining 
whether there was a difference in daily mean returns was conducted however, the p-value of 0.12 
meant that returns weren’t significantly different over the time-period investigated at a 5% level of 
significance. 
 
91 
 
Figure 30: S&P 500 Index vs. trading rule cumulative returns 
 
 
Figure 31: S&P 500 Index vs. trading rule drawdowns 
 
 
While the trading rule may have underperformed the S&P 500 Index on an absolute basis, when 
observing drawdowns in figure 31, the trading rule proved to exhibit a better drawdown profile. The 
rising levels of volatility that preceded large drawdowns such as the 1987 Flash Crash led to non-
participation that allowed the trading rule to exit the market early enough to avoid drawdowns as deep 
as were experienced by the S&P 500 Index.  
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It is reasonable to assume that not all future tail-events will be preceded by high levels of volatility. 
However, it is evident from figure 31 that the worst of both the 1987 Flash Crash and the 2008 GFC 
was avoided by the trading rule given elevated levels of volatility before the steepest drawdowns. 
Interestingly, the US recession experienced from 2001 to 2003 saw a long drawdown episode for both 
strategies meaning that the trading rule still experienced some equity exposure as volatility did not 
spike to the extent it did in previous drawdown episodes.  
 
The maximum drawdown experienced by the S&P 500 Index was -56.78% compared with just -
18.17% by the trading rule. This again makes the case that the trading rule is effective during periods 
of market losses as the trading rule seemed to underperform the S&P 500 Index during bull markets. 
It is clear that the S&P 500 Index outperformed the trading rule from the early 1980s up to the lead 
up to the dot-com bubble in the late 1990s, but the trading rule was able to make up considerable 
ground during the bubble and the 2008 GFC. Tail-risk measures again suggested that the trading rule 
had an appealing risk profile with daily 95% and 99% CVaR at -1.24% and -1.96% respectively vs -
2.46% and -4.22% for the S&P 500 Index. The best 6-month HPR for the trading rule and the S&P 
500 Index was 26.98% and 48.29% respectively, and the worst 6-month HPR was -11.94% and -
46.64% respectively. Thus, it appears that there are considerable tail-risk improvements associated 
with the trading rule. 
 
Figure 32: S&P 500 Index trading rule exposure illustration 
 
 
Figure 32 above illustrates the changes of S&P 500 Index exposure the trading rule had over the 
period together with the overall trading rule trendline. The light blue line illustrates the cumulative 
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return of the trading rule over the period, and the orange line illustrates the cumulative return on the 
S&P 500 Index over the period which are identical to figure 30. The reason that the S&P 500 Index 
cumulative return is in different colours is to provide a visual illustration of periods of participation. 
That is, periods of dark blue indicate that some allocation between 33% and 100% was given to the 
S&P 500 Index. Periods of orange indicate that a 0% allocation was given to the S&P 500 Index. 
Thus, the sum of the dark blue periods on the cumulative return line of the S&P 500 Index would 
result in the light blue cumulative return line of the trading rule.   
 
With a naked eye, one can observe that the trading rule did not participate in many of the larger 
drawdown episodes across the period. However, there were many occasions of needless switching 
between participation and non-participation caused by false signals. In fact, the average switches in 
equity exposure over the period were 11.87 per year which would naturally result in more transaction 
costs than a passively holding the S&P 500 Index. This is a drawback of this approach. 
 
Ultimately, investors would have had an effective equity exposure of 53.53% over the period which 
captured much of the bull markets and tended to avoid the brunt of the bear markets and crises. 
Despite the appealing results, the high relatively large number of switches, false switches, and 
relatively low effective equity exposure presents a case that the above trading rule might be most 
effective as a replacement for a part of equity allocation as opposed to the entire allocation. The main 
reason for this is that many investors may require holding a minimum effective strategic asset 
allocation to equity but during any given year, the trading rule could have a 0% exposure to equity. 
Thus in a 60/40 portfolio for example, the trading rule could perhaps be applied to half of the equity 
exposure for example. 
 
Further, it is important to note that the return on the risk-free asset was considerably higher than the 
current near-zero rate. Specifically, the average 3-month US Treasury bill rate during the 1970s was 
6.40%, 8.97% during the 1980s and 4.98% during the 1990s. Thus, during periods of non-
participation by the strategy in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, a higher return on cash was earned when 
compared with current rates. The implication of this is that the strategy may not perform as well in 
the future when equity is allotted no allocation given the probability of low interest rate environments 
to persist. 
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Table 20: S&P 500 Index vs. trading rule summary statistics 
 Trading Rule S&P 500 Index 
Annualized HPR 
5.91% 7.03% 
Annualized Volatility 
7.85% 17.12% 
Sharpe Ratio 
0.14 0.13 
VaR (95%) 
-0.81% -1.60% 
CVaR (95%) 
-1.24% -2.46% 
VaR (99%) 
-1.52% -2.88% 
CVaR (99%) 
-1.96% -4.22% 
Maximum Drawdown 
-18.17% -56.78% 
Effective Equity Exposure 
53.53% 100% 
Average Annual Switches 
11.87 0 
 
• MSCI EAFE Index 
 
Figure 33 below illustrates the performance of the trading rule compared to the MSCI EAFE Index. 
While the trading rule kept pace with the MSCI EAFE Index initially, the MSCI EAFE Index began 
outperforming the trading from approximately the fourth quarter of 1985 up to the 2008 GFC. 
Thereafter, the MSCI EAFE Index showed a strong initial recovery with up to the fourth quarter of 
2009, promptly outperforming the trading rule suggesting that the trendline of the trading rule does 
not seem to compete with the MSCI EAFE Index during a bull market. On an absolute basis, the 
trading rule generated an annualized HPRs of 5.65% compared with the 7.15% generated by the 
MSCI EAFE Index. Despite the absolute underperformance suffered by the trading rule, the t-test 
revealed that the mean returns did not differ significantly at a 5% level of significance. 
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Figure 33: MSCI EAFE Index vs. trading rule cumulative returns 
 
 
Figure 34: MSCI EAFE Index vs. trading rule drawdowns 
 
 
Figure 34 illustrates the drawdowns of both strategies, and it is evident that the drawdown protection 
brought about by the trading rule was not as impressive as in figure 31. The early 2000s highlight a 
weakness of the trading rule in that it offers little respite when losses occur gradually without the 
spikes in volatility associated with sudden losses. Additionally, the fact the trading rule did not issue 
a participation signal early enough after the GFC to participate in the recovery meant that the 
drawdown was subsequently exacerbated. 
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Figure 35: MSCI EAFE Index trading rule exposure illustration 
 
 
Table 21: MSCI EAFE Index vs. trading rule summary statistics 
 Trading Rule MSCI EAFE Index 
Annualized HPR 
5.65% 7.14% 
Annualized Volatility 
7.18% 15.96% 
Sharpe Ratio 
0.14 0.15 
VaR (95%) 
-0.73% -1.54% 
CVaR (95%) 
-1.14% -2.33% 
VaR (99%) 
-1.40% -2.70% 
CVaR (99%) 
-1.85% -3.89% 
Maximum Drawdown 
-35.68% -61.85% 
Effective Equity Exposure 
47.70% 100% 
Average Annual Switches 
14.95 0 
 
Figure 35 above highlights that a significant portion of the recovery after the GFC was missed by the 
trading strategy with 14.95 switches on average per annum across the period. Despite this, the trading 
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rule still experienced significantly less volatility than the MSCI EAFE Index (7.18% and 15.96% 
respectively as shown in table 21). Additionally, the 1-in-100 day CVaR was -1.85% for the trading 
rule compared to -3.89% for the MSCI EAFE Index. With an effective equity exposure of just 47.70% 
however, the trading rule again presents a challenge for investors who have fixed strategic asset 
allocations in mind, suggesting that it may be more appropriate to replace only a portion of existing 
equity allocation. The best 6-month HPR for the trading rule and the MSCI EAFE Index was 26.74% 
and 64.04% respectively, and the worst 6-month HPR was -17.71% and -50.65% respectively. Similar 
to the findings on the S&P 500 index, these statistics reveal that there are considerable tail-risk 
improvements associated with the implementation of the trading rule. 
 
• MSCI EM Index 
 
Figure 36 illustrates the results of the trading rule vs. the MSCI EM Index. It is evident that the rule 
performed marginally better than the MSCI EM Index on both a risk and return basis. The  annualized 
HPR was 3.55% for the trading rule and 2.76% for the index over the period, however, mean returns 
did not prove to be significantly different at a 5% level of significance.  
 
Figure 36: MSCI EM Index vs. trading rule cumulative returns 
 
Figure 37 displays the drawdowns across the period, and it is interesting to note that while the trading 
rule performed well during the GFC, more gradual losses not associated with spikes in volatility 
resulted in unimpressive drawdown protection in the early 2000s and subsequent to the GFC. As 
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expected, the MSCI EM Index’s annualized volatility of 18.71% was higher than the 9.89% 
experienced by the trading rule.  
 
Figure 37: MSCI EM Index vs. trading rule drawdowns 
 
In terms of the tail-risk measures, table 22 shows that the trading rule experienced a 95% CVaR of -
2.26% and a 99% CVaR of -2.49% compared to -4.08% and -4.88% respectively for the MSCI EM 
Index.  Again the deepest drawdown of -66.06% was more severe in the case of the index compared 
with –48.05% for the trading rule. The best 6-month HPR for the trading rule and the MSCI EM 
Index was 39.23% and 77.50% respectively, and the worst 6-month HPR was -25.71% and -61.95% 
respectively. Again, these findings are consistent with those of the developed markets in that the 
trading rule appears to contribute toward tail-risk improvements. 
 
The 51.43% effective equity exposure experienced by the trading rule was similar to the effective 
exposure found developed markets and yet again presents an issue when a fixed asset allocation to 
equity is desired. Similar to developed markets, there were a few periods of a 0% equity allocation 
during which equity was experiencing upward momentum, particularly during periods of recovery. 
Average annual switches were found to be 12.22 which was higher than for the S&P 500 Index and 
MSCI EAFE index trading rules which can be viewed in figure 38 below. Given that volatility levels 
were also found to be higher in emerging markets than developed markets, one would expect this to 
result in more switches in allocation. The inherent disadvantage of this is that higher transaction costs 
would have had to be incurred which would have led to a larger drag on performance relative to the 
other markets.  
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Figure 38: MSCI EM Index trading rule exposure illustration 
 
 
Table 22: MSCI EM Index vs. trading rule summary statistics 
 Trading Rule MSCI EM Index 
Annualized HPR 
3.55% 2.76% 
Annualized Volatility 
9.89% 18.71% 
Sharpe Ratio 
0.11 0.01 
VaR (95%) 
-1.07% -1.87% 
CVaR (95%) 
-2.26% -4.08% 
VaR (99%) 
-1.90% -3.45% 
CVaR (99%) 
-2.49% -4.88% 
Maximum Drawdown 
-48.05% -66.06% 
Effective Equity Exposure 
51.43% 100% 
Average Annual Switches 
12.22 0 
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• MSCI FM Index 
 
The final market investigated was the MSCI FM Index. Table 23 below shows annualized HPRs of -
5.46% and 1.79% were generated by the MSCI FM Index and the trading rule respectively. Figure 39 
illustrates that the trading rule initially generated similar returns to the MSCI FM Index, but a 
significant drawdown (largely avoided by the trading rule) in the early 2000s saw the trading rule 
begin its relative outperformance up to the end of the period.  
 
Figure 39: MSCI FM Index vs. trading rule cumulative returns 
 
 
Figure 40: MSCI FM Index vs. trading rule drawdowns 
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The t-test conducted over daily returns confirmed that the mean daily returns of both the trading rule 
and the MSCI FM Index differed at a 5% level of significance. Figure 40 illustrates the drawdowns 
of both the trading rule and the index and it is clear that the 0% equity allocation decision at the 
beginning of subsequently severe drawdowns experienced in the early 2000s and the GFC helped the 
trading rule outperform the index.  
 
The tail-risk measures show that the 95% daily CVaR for the index was -2.27% compared with a far 
lower 1.17% for the trading rule and the 99% daily CVaR was -4.31% for the index and -2.04% for 
the trading rule. The deepest drawdown experienced by the index was a considerably severe -68.62% 
compared with -33.61% for the trading rule. The best 6-month HPR for the trading rule and the MSCI 
FM Index was 25.35% and 49.05% respectively, and the worst 6-month HPR was -18.51% and -
62.98% respectively. Thus, consistent with the findings of the other markets investigated in this 
dissertation, it appears that there are considerable tail-risk improvements associated with the 
implementation of the trading rule. 
 
Given that there were prolonged periods of a 0% equity participation by the trading rule, figure 41 
illustrates that there were an average of 8.79 switches per annum. This was lower than the other 
markets. There were also fewer false signals as there was a 72.26% effective equity allocation during 
the period.  
 
Figure 41: MSCI FM Index trading rule exposure illustration 
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Table 23: MSCI FM Index vs. trading rule summary statistics 
 Trading Rule MSCI FM Index 
Annualized HPR 
1.79% -5.46% 
Annualized Volatility 
7.14% 12.95% 
Sharpe Ratio 
0.10 -0.50 
VaR (95%) 
-0.74% -1.21% 
CVaR (95%) 
-1.17% -2.27% 
VaR (99%) 
-1.38% -3.02% 
CVaR (99%) 
-2.04% -4.31% 
Maximum Drawdown 
-33.61% -68.62% 
Effective Equity Exposure 
72.26% 100% 
Average Annual Switches 
8.79 0 
 
In summary, the application of the trading rule in each market appeared to have similar results in that 
tail-risk statistics as measured by daily 95% and 99% CVaR, maximum drawdown and worst 6-month 
HPR were considerably improved. Additionally, the trading rule generated superior Sharpe ratios in 
each market other than the MSCI EAFE Index. However, the relatively high number of trades 
required to implement the trading rule is a pitfall of the approach. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
                         CONCLUSION 
 
The research question investigated in this dissertation is whether volatility, first, in the form of an 
asset class, and second, in the form of a risk management tool, can reduce the risk that a 60/40 
equity/bond portfolio experiences inferior risk-adjusted performance in the future relative to what it 
had accomplished in the past. Regarding volatility exposure as an asset class, the historical risk and 
return characteristics of three fully-collateralized naked put option-selling strategies, a fully-
collateralized bull put spread strategy and a fully-collateralized VIX futures strategy was investigated. 
The put option-selling strategies consisted of the CBOE S&P 500 PutWrite Index (PutWrite Index), 
a short at-the-money S&P 500 Index options strategy (short ATM options strategy) and a short 5% 
out-the-money S&P 500 Index options strategy (short 5% OTM options strategy). The bear put spread 
strategy involved being simultaneously short at-the-money S&P 500 Index options and long 10% out-
the-money S&P 500 Index options with the same expiration date, and the VIX futures strategy 
involved being short VIX futures when the VIX futures curve was in contango, and being long VIX 
futures when the VIX futures curve was in backwardation. 
 
The results indicate that the three options selling strategies outperformed the S&P 500 Index over the 
period with the PutWrite Index, short ATM options strategy and short 5% OTM options strategy 
generating annualized HPRs of 6.61%, 6.77% and 7.43% respectively, compared with the 4.97% 
generated by the S&P 500 Index. The option-selling strategies all had less severe drawdown profiles 
and more rapid recoveries than the S&P 500 Index, consistent with the findings of Rennison and 
Pedersen (2012), who attributed this phenomenon to the fact that option premiums are still 
consistently earned despite any drawdowns experienced. However, the more conservative bull put 
spread strategy underperformed the S&P 500 Index generating an annualized HPR of 2.37%.  
 
Consistent with the findings of Simon and Campasano (2014), the VIX futures strategy outperformed 
the index considerably over the investigated period, generating an annualized HPR of 19.82%. 
However, when the sub-sample period from 2009 to 2016 was investigated, the VIX futures strategy 
underperformed the S&P 500 Index generating an annualized HPR of 7.34% compared to 13.88% 
generated by the index. The findings of Simon and Campasano (2014) suggest that the VIX futures 
strategy relies on the assumption that the VIX spot price will not change over time to the degree 
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suggested by the VIX futures price. The findings of this dissertation indicate that investors were 
historically able to exploit this phenomenon by buying (selling) the VIX future at a discount 
(premium) relative to the VIX spot successfully up to the end of the 2008 GFC. However, after the 
2008 GFC, it appears that the VIX futures basis has contracted, resulting in a contraction of profits. 
In other words, while the VIX futures strategy successfully exploited potential non-pricing of 
volatility clustering up to the 2008 GFC, it appears that since the 2008 GFC, much of this 
phenomenon has been traded away. Additionally, it is still unclear whether the VIX futures strategy 
can be classified as an asset class in the same way as short volatility exposure attained through option-
selling strategies.   
 
Each volatility strategy was also included as part of a 30/30/40 volatility/equity/bond portfolio and 
compared with the traditional 60/40 equity/bond portfolio. Over the full sample period, all volatility 
blended portfolios outperformed the traditional 60/40 portfolio on an absolute return basis and in 
terms of Sharpe ratios except for the bull put spread strategy blend, which generated the least return 
overall as well as an equal Sharpe ratio to the traditional mix.  Additionally, all volatility blended 
portfolios were superior to the 60/40 portfolio in terms of tail-risk, experiencing less severe maximum 
drawdowns, annualized volatility and daily 95% and 99% Conditional Value-at-Risk levels.  
 
When investigating the sub-sample period from 2009 to 2016, the strong equity recovery following 
the 2008 Global Financial Crisis resulted in the 60/40 portfolio experiencing the highest annualized 
return, but the returns achieved by the three option-selling strategy blends were only marginally less. 
The three option-selling strategy blends also generated larger Sharpe ratios than the 60/40 portfolio, 
and all volatility blended portfolios achieved a superior tail-risk profile to the traditional portfolio 
mix.  
 
Regarding the investigation of volatility as a tool for dynamic equity allocation, based on the 
volatility-responsive trading rule developed in Collie, Sylvanus and Thomas (2011), a managed 
volatility trading rule was investigated that used recent realized volatility as a signal to regulate equity 
exposure in an effort to reduce equity drawdown risk. According to the trading rule, if recent realized 
volatility levels rose beyond a certain threshold, equity exposure was reduced and replaced with 3-
month US T-bills and vica versa.  
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The trading rule was tested across 4 different indices aimed to represent the majority of global markets 
namely: The S&P 500 Index (US), the MSCI EAFE Index (developed markets excluding the US), 
the MSCI EM Index (emerging markets) and the MSCI FM Index (frontier markets). The trading rule 
experienced generally positive results across markets, generating competitive absolute returns, and 
generally achieving better risk profiles than the respective equity index’s they were compared to. 
However, the trading rule presented practical implementation challenges such as a relatively high 
number of trades, the lowest of which was 8.79 trades on average per year on the MSCI FM Index, 
and the highest of which was 14.95 trades on average per year on the MSCI EAFE Index. 
Additionally, the approach may pose a challenge to investors who are mandated with fixed strategic 
asset allocation targets given that equity allocations could theoretically be 0% for extended periods.  
 
In conclusion, the replacement of half of the equity allocation in a traditional 60/40 equity/bond 
portfolio with strategies that employ the consistent sale of naked, near-the-money options strategies 
have historically generated long-run returns analogous to the traditional portfolio mix with 
considerably improved tail-risk characteristics. Short volatility exposure attained through option-
selling strategies has thus been shown to be an attractive asset class, and has presented historical 
evidence that its inclusion into a traditional 60/40 equity/bond portfolio is likely to reduce the risk of 
future risk-adjusted underperformance relative to past achievements. Additionally, although 
somewhat impractical, realized volatility is found to be an effective forward indicator to regulate 
equity exposure such that equity drawdown risk is reduced. This may further reduce the risk of 
traditional portfolios underperforming in future and may be especially useful to investors precluded 
from investing in volatility exposure as an asset class.  
 
Future research may investigate whether delta-hedged option-selling strategies generate similar risk-
adjusted returns as those examined in this dissertation. Further, only the sale of equity volatility was 
explored in this dissertation, and future research may investigate and contrast the risk-return 
characteristics after costs of implementation of the sale of volatility on other asset classes such as 
bonds, currencies, property and commodities. 
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